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Abstract
THE EFFECTS OF MOOD AND PERCEIVED COST ON SELF-DISCLOSURE OF
DEVIANT SEXUAL FANTASY AND BEHAVIOUR
by
JORDAN STUART MAILE
Advisor: Professor Maureen Allwood
The present study examined the effects of mood state (happy vs. neutral vs. sad) and
perceptions of cost (anonymous vs. “non-anonymous”) on self-disclosure of deviant sexual
fantasies and behavior (e.g. pedophilic, coercive). Research suggests that mood may affect
decision making in “risky” situations, such that a positive mood state may increase risky decision
making. It could be argued that disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior can be
conceptualized as a “risky” situation; therefore, it is hypothesized that a positive mood state
would increase disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, but only when doing so is
perceived to be “low” in cost (i.e., anonymous). Online survey data was collected from 331 adult
male and female community members recruited through an online posting service, and online
and print advertisements in a weekly commuter publication. Participants provided demographic
information; had their cost perception related to disclosing manipulated via different assurances
of anonymity (i.e., anonymous vs. “non-anonymous”); and were induced into a happy, sad, or
neutral mood state via an emotionally valenced autobiographical memory recall task. Participants
then answered questions about deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviours;
and attitudes toward sexual material; social desirability; trait happiness; and trait sadness. Results
found that high cost perception (i.e., “non-anonymous”), compared to low cost perception (i.e.,
anonymous), depressed the number and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies and masturbatory
fantasies, but not behaviours, reported by participants. Mood did not significantly affect sexual
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self-disclosure. These data suggest that an assurance of anonymity helps to facilitate sexual selfdisclosure, but may have an “upper limit” in its facilitative effect. This study was limited by a
lack of statistical power and a relatively weak mood manipulation, both of which could be
addressed in future research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Much of social science research depends on the collection of socially sensitive
information from research participants, such as political attitudes, drug use, and sexuality.
However, response patterns to these types of questions, particularly those related to sexual
material, may be prone to reporting biases due to the private and personal nature of the subject
matter (Catania, Gibson, Chitwood, & Coates, 1990; Herold & Way, 1988). Thus, research that
relies on sexual self-disclosure, such as HIV/AIDS research, sexual offender research, and even
research that involves less stigmatized constructs, such as dating behavior, may be subject to
reporting biases. This is particularly problematic given that these data are used to inform theory,
prevention, and intervention efforts in these areas. For example, obtaining accurate selfdisclosure of sexual behavior from community participants is vital in the understanding of
transmission patterns of sexually transmitted infections, such as HIV. In forensic settings,
accurate self report from non-offending and sexual offending samples of both normative and
deviant sexual fantasy and behavior are important for etiological theories of sexual offending and
risk assessment and management. Therefore, it behooves researchers to know which factors may
influence, and how they may influence, sexual self-disclosure patterns. Catania and his
colleagues (1990) suggest that one factor that might influence sexual self-disclosure response
patterns is mood.
Previous research on self-disclosure of sensitive material, such as sexuality, has largely
neglected the role of mood and instead focused on factors such as question wording (e.g., Blair,
Sudman, Bradburn, & Stocking, 1977; Catania et al., 1996); static intrapersonal factors, such as
personality traits (e.g., Meston, Heiman, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 1998); and demographics (e.g.,
Wiederman, 1993). In fact, over twenty years ago Catania and colleagues (1990) pointed out
that no research had examined the potential impact of mood states on participant response
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patterns on sexuality surveys; after a review of the current literature, this statement still holds
true today. Therefore, research that addresses the impact of specific mood states on response
patterns on sexual surveys would help to fill this gap in the literature.
The proposed study seeks to examine the effect of two mood states, happiness and
sadness, on self-disclosure patterns of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior. In the following
sections, a general introduction of reporting bias in self-report surveys, and sexuality surveys
more specifically, will be provided. This will be followed by an overview of the mood and risky
decision making literature, providing a theoretical basis for the potential influence of mood on
patterns of sexual self-disclosure, which can be conceptualized as a form of risky decision
making. Next, a brief overview of research on the effect of mood on non-sexual self-disclosure,
and potential moderaters of sexual self-disclosure, will be presented. The final sections will
cover the methodology of the current study, the presentation and discussion of the results and
suggested directions for future research, and end with concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2: PROBLEMS WITH SELF-REPORT DATA
Self-report data has a long history of being criticized for proneness to distortion and
inaccuracy; that is, individuals who complete self-report surveys often answer in ways that are
not entirely honest. In the following sections, a definition of response bias and its various forms
will be provided, followed by a more specific focus on response bias in sexuality research.
Definition of Response Bias
Response bias is defined as "conditions or factors that take place during the process of
responding to surveys, affecting the way responses are provided" (Villar, 2008) and has been a
long-standing problem for survey researchers in the social sciences since the early twentieth
century (e.g., Bernreuter, 1933 as cited in Meston, Heiman, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 1998).
Response bias negatively impacts the accuracy of information collected in survey research, and
can obscure or distort the relationship among variables under study. In a review of 14,275 selfreport survey-based research studies covering a range of topics, van de Mortel (2008) found that
only 31 (0.2%) included a measure of response bias, and almost half of this subsample of studies
was noted to have their results influenced by response bias.
Even more problematically, specific domains of information may be more prone to
response bias than others due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter (King & Bruner, 2000).
Response bias is more likely to occur when the topic under study is of a sensitive or private
nature, such as sexuality (Catania et al., 1990; Rogers & Turner, 1991).
Response Bias in Sexuality Research
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Response bias is considered to be one of the major methodological issues plaguing
sexuality research. Questions of a sexual nature are likely to induce feelings of embarrassment or
threat in research participants, thereby increasing the likelihood that participants will
inaccurately report about the phenomenon under study (Herold & Way, 1988). Response bias has
been noted in sexuality research in both community and forensic settings.
In community based research samples, response bias has been a notable problem in areas
ranging from child sexual abuse to sexually transmitted infections (STIs). For example, one of
the most enduring and problematic issues facing child sexual abuse research is accurately
estimating its prevalence based on research participants self-report, with estimates ranging from
3% to 62% (Gorey & Leslie, 1997). Gorey and Leslie (1997) opined that participant response
bias was likely one of the major contributors to the variability in prevalence estimates for child
sexual abuse.
Similarly, understanding the accurate incidence and prevalence of high risk sexual
behaviours (e.g., failure to use condoms) is critical in understanding transmission patterns of
STIs; however, these behaviours are often underreported, ostensibly due to the stigma attached to
these (Johnson et al., 2001). DiFrenceisco and colleagues (1998) noted that in a sample of urban
American men who had sex with men (MSM), participants generally underreported high risk
sexual behaviours, such as unprotected anal sex, that may put them at increased risk of
transmitting or contracting HIV. This problem is not limited to just HIV, but all STIs (Langhaug,
Sherr, & Cowan, 2010).
In forensic research settings, accurate self-report of paraphilic fantasy and behaviour
(e.g., pedophilic, coercive) in correctional and community samples is essential in understanding
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the etiology, maintenance, treatment, and risk management of sexual offending behaviour.
However, sex offender researchers note that the underreporting or denial of deviant sexual
fantasy and behaviour is a frequent problem (Barbaree, 1991; Happell & Auffrey, 1995). For
example, two studies found that juvenile sex offenders disclosed a greater number of sexual
offences (Emerick & Dutton, 1993) and details related to their sexual offences (Harrison & Eliot,
1999) when tested, or led to believe they would be tested, with a polygraph exam; suggesting
that they were minimizing or withholding this information prior to the introduction (or threat) of
the polygraph. Understandably, sex offenders are often motivated to misreport this information
due to sentencing and release considerations, and their own personal safety in the correctional
environment.
In summary, response bias has hampered researchers ability to investigate various
sexuality topics across both community and forensic settings. The next chapter will introduce a
review of risky decision making, the role of mood in risky decision making, and provide a
theoretical foundation for explaining why mood might be expected to influence response patterns
of sexual self disclosure, a form of decision making that can be conceptualized as "risky."
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CHAPTER 3: RISKY DECISION MAKING: THE ROLE OF MOOD

In the decision making literature, decision making is usually discussed in terms of
certainty of the decision making process. In other words, decision making is categorized as being
conducted under certain or uncertain conditions. Decision making under conditions of certainty
suggests that the individual making the decision knows the potential outcome, and the
probability of the outcome prior to making the decision. Therefore, making decisions under
conditions of certainty essentially removes any potential risk, because there is no variability in
the outcome. However, the literature on decision making has largely focused on decision
making under conditions of uncertainty, which is further divided into two subtypes:
"ambiguous" and "risky" decision making. Ambiguous decision making refers to situations
where the individual knows the possible outcome(s), but not the likelihood/probability of the
outcome(s); In contrast, risky decision making refers to situations where the individual does not
know what the potential outcomes will be (i.e., “risky” decisions) (Lauriola, Levin, & Hart,
2007). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offered a more parsimonious definition of risky
decision making, such that risky decisions are those that involve more than one potential
outcome, with the degree of risk increasing as the number of possible outcomes increases. For
the purposes of this study, the latter definition of risky decision making will be adopted.
The most prominent model used to predict risky decision making is Prospect Theory and
its various iterations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Essentially,
Prospect Theory suggests decision making consists of two stages, including the “framing” and
“valuation” stages. In the framing stage, the individual sets up the choice situation by
considering the possible actions, likelihoods, and outcomes related to the decision. In the
valuation stage, the individual assesses the value of each choice option and selects an option to
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maximize the value obtained (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In its most basic form, Prospect
Theory suggests that individuals will define the possible choices, their outcomes, the
probabilities associated with these outcomes (i.e., framing stage); and the value of each of these
potential outcomes (i.e., valuation stage) before making a decision. However, Prospect Theory
(and other related theories) have been criticized for assuming decisions are made in a "cold" and
rational way, and neglect the role of emotion/moods on the decision making process
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, p. 619). More recently, research on risky decision making has
increasingly incorporated emotions/moods, and investigated how these influence probability
estimation and valuation of outcomes during the decision making process.
Definitions of Mood, Affect, and Emotion
The terms mood, affect, and emotion are often used interchangeably in lay parlance;
however, their definitions vary in the clinical and research literatures. In the clinical literature,
affect and mood are typically differentiated in terms of temporal duration and whether they are
external/observable or internal/unobservable in nature (Serby, 2003). More specifically, affect is
described as transient and observable, while mood is described as longer lasting and
unobservable (Serby, 2003). However, these clinical definitions are primarily useful for
descriptive purposes, and do not speak to the sources of, or functional differences between, affect
and mood.
In contrast to the clinical literature, the experimental literature tends to use the term affect
as an umbrella term under which mood and emotion are subsumed (Forgas, 1994,1995), and it
also focuses more on the sources of mood and emotion and their impact on subsequent behavior.
Mood is often characterized as a “low-level affective state with no immediate antecedent cause,”
(Forgas, 1991, p. 5). In contrast, emotions are more highly specified and intense states that are

8
typically shorter in duration than moods (Clore & Tamir, 2002). More importantly, emotions are
generally elicited by and readily attributable to an external cause, while moods are not. This
distinction is important because it has different implications for an individual’s awareness of the
influence of their affective state (either mood or emotion) on their behavior. While emotion can
influence behavior, the individual is typically aware that one’s emotional state is doing so (Clore
& Tamir, 2002). Ostensibly, the individual is able to modify one’s behavior accordingly in most
cases. Conversely, the individual is typically not aware of any particular reason for, or cause of,
a given mood state. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis (2002), mood—which
may be unrelated to the decision making situation (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003, p. 620)—acts
as more of a “background” affective state that can influence subsequent decision making and
behavior without the individual being aware of its influence. Given that an individual is always
experiencing some type and degree of mood, it follows that mood is likely to influence decision
making processes in all situations (Clore & Tamir, 2002), including in situations requiring selfdisclosure of sensitive information, such as sexual self-disclosure. For the purposes of the
current study, and consistent with the research literature, mood will be defined as a “lingering
low-level affective state that is present after an emotional reaction to a stimulus, and as having an
unrecognized influence on subsequent decision making.”
The Role of Mood in Risky Decision Making
To date, research in the area of mood and risky decision making has largely focused on
how mood influences cognitive appraisals of probability and valuation (hereafter, it will be
referred to as cost) of an expected outcome, and their subsequent impact on the decision making
process. Research has generally found that positively and negatively valenced mood states have
different effects on probability estimates of a negative outcome, and hence the decision making
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process (Bless et al., 1990; Forgas, 1982; Isen & Means, 1983); however, these effects may be
contingent upon the perceived cost of the outcome (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988; Isen, Nygren,
& Ashby, 1988; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Nygren, 1998; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). In
other words, the effect of mood valence on risky decision making may be different depending on
the how “costly” the potential negative outcome is perceived to be. For example, research
participants’ willingness to disclose “deviant” sexual fantasies and/or behavior may change
according to their mood state and the perceived potential cost for doing so. Therefore, in the
following sections, research examining the role of positive and negative mood states under
various cost or perceived cost conditions in risky decision making will be presented.
The Role of Positive Mood in Risky Decision Making. Positive mood states, such as
happiness, have been consistently found to influence judgment, including risk taking and related
decision making strategies (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983). Researchers suggest
that a positive mood state may engender feelings of safety and a perception that the environment
is non-threatening (Forgas, 1982; Frijda, 1988; Nygren et al., 1996). Accordingly, in risky
situations, individuals in a positive mood state tend to perceive any potential negative outcomes
as less likely than individuals in a neutral or negative mood state (Gasper & Clore, 1998).
Moreover, according to the “mood maintenance” hypothesis (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen & Patrick,
1983), individuals in a positive mood state are motivated to preserve their positive mood and will
engage in behavior that is consistent with this goal. However, what this means in terms of risky
decision making depends on the individual’s perception of the potential cost involved. More
specifically, the effect of positive mood on risky decision making has been found to differ
depending on whether the decision maker perceives the cost as negligible (“low cost”) or highly
aversive (“high cost”).
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Low cost conditions. Positive mood states may facilitate risky decision making under
conditions of low cost, i.e., when the negative outcome is either imaginary or not particularly
aversive (Arkes et al., 1988). As previously noted, a positive mood state tends to lead to
underestimation of the likelihood of a negative outcome. Moreover, under low cost conditions,
engaging in risky decision making and behavior does not pose a threat to the decision maker’s
positive mood since the individual has nothing “real” to lose. Therefore, given that cost
considerations are not important in low cost risky situations, individuals in a positive mood state
are more likely to use the lower probability estimates of the negative outcome in guiding their
decision making (Arkes et al., 1988; Yuen & Lee, 2003). Not surprisingly then, under low cost
conditions, a positive mood state is associated with increased risky decision making (Yuen &
Lee, 2003).
In a seminal study conducted by Johnson and Tversky (1983), it was found that when
participants were induced into a positive mood state, they made lower probability estimations for
a variety of negative events. The participants had been asked to read a newspaper story regarding
a particular tragedy, and when in a positive mood state, these same participants estimated a
variety of negative events, even ones unlike the featured newspaper tragedy, as less likely to
happen to them. The authors suggested that a positive mood state may facilitate a mindset where
global estimates of risk are decreased irrespective of their relevance to the current situation. In a
similar study, Wright and Bower (1992) found that positive mood participants estimated a
variety of negative events as less likely to happen to them than did negative mood or control
participants.
Although these two studies provide information regarding probability estimations of
possible negative life events, these studies did not examine actual decision making. In a study
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that focused more specifically on decision making, a group of undergraduate participants
induced into a positive mood state after watching a happy movie clip, were asked to make
choices in a series of hypothetical “everyday” life dilemmas (Yuen & Lee, 2003). The results
demonstrated that participants in a positive mood state were more likely to make riskier
decisions compared to participants in a neutral or negative mood state. Similarly, Nygren (1998)
also found that undergraduate participants induced into a positive mood state, by receiving a
small gift and reading positive statements, were willing to make riskier gambles for hypothetical
credit hours than were participants induced into a negative mood state.
It should be noted, however, that the preceding studies required participants to engage in
risk estimation and risky decision making involving hypothetical situations. For example, in
Yuen & Lee’s (2003) and Nygren’s (1998) studies, participants were asked to make choices in
hypothetical everyday dilemmas or make hypothetical risky gambles; hence, the participants had
nothing tangible to lose for making riskier choices in these scenarios and the actual cost attached
to the negative outcomes of their estimations/decisions was non-existent. Therefore, individuals
appear to be more likely to make riskier choices as long as the potential negative outcome or
“loss” is negligible, or hypothetical in nature (i.e., low cost).
In sum, individuals in a positive mood state not only underestimate the probability of a
negative outcome, but in low cost scenarios, they also do not perceive the negative outcome as
particularly aversive. Therefore, engaging in risky decision making does not pose a threat to
maintaining a positive mood state, and hence, risky decision making and behavior is more likely
to result. In terms of sexual self-disclosure, in situations where there is little cost attached to
making such disclosures (i.e., responses are anonymous and confidential), an individual in a
positive mood state should be more likely to disclose deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior
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than an individual in a neutral or negative mood state. However, in risky situations when a high
cost is attached to the negative outcome, then a positive mood state has been found to have an
opposite effect on decision making (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen et al., 1988;
Nygren, 1998; Nygren et al., 1996).
High cost conditions. Generally, when individuals are in a positive mood state and
perceive a potential negative outcome as meaningful or high in “cost,” they tend to demonstrate
what is called “probability insensitivity” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). In
other words, they tend to no longer use the lower probability estimates of the negative outcome
in guiding their decision making; rather, perceived cost becomes the most salient consideration
(Arkes et al., 1988; Nygren, 1998). Essentially, individuals will switch from using a probabilityfocused rule to a cost-focused rule in guiding their decision making. In addition, a high cost is
perceived as even more aversive in a positive mood state compared to a negative or neutral mood
state (Isen et al., 1988). A positive mood state provides a different reference point for evaluating
the “costliness” of a negative outcome, such that it will be perceived as qualitatively more
aversive than if it was evaluated during a neutral or negative mood state (Isen et al., 1988;
Nygren, 1998). Moreover, as noted earlier, the mood maintenance hypothesis would suggest that
individuals in a positive mood state would perceive a potential high cost in a risky situation as
particularly aversive because it poses a threat to the maintenance of their positive mood state. As
a result, they would engage in behavior to protect their positive mood (Clark & Isen, 1982).
Therefore, under high cost conditions, individuals in a positive mood state are likely to engage in
more conservative decision making (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Arkes et al., 1988; Isen et al., 1988).
A series of studies conducted by Isen and colleagues (Isen et al., 1988; Nygren, 1998;
Nygren et al., 1996) examined the effect of mood state on risky decision making. Positive mood
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condition participants were induced into a positive mood by a small gift of candy or by reading a
list of positive statements in addition to a gift of candy. Positive mood participants exhibited
what the authors called “cautious optimism” when engaging in high-stakes gambling tasks. More
specifically, these individuals demonstrated more conservative gambling strategies when they
ran the risk of losing a tangible prize in the form of blank video cassettes or research credit hours
compared to individuals in a control condition (i.e., those who received no mood induction) or
negative mood condition. Positive mood participants exhibited a greater sensitivity to losses and
made more conservative gambling choices than their control and negative mood counterparts.
In summary, positive mood can have differential effects on risky decision making
depending on the perceived cost of the potential negative outcome (Isen et al., 1988; Nygren et
al., 1996). If the cost is perceived as negligible, then individuals in a positive mood state are
more likely to focus on the low probability of a negative outcome, and hence, are more likely to
engage in risky decision making than are individuals in a neutral or negative mood state.
Conversely, if the cost is perceived as highly aversive, then individuals in a positive mood state
are more likely to focus on the potential cost than the low probability of the negative outcome,
and hence, be less likely to engage in risky decision making than individuals in a neutral or
negative mood state. In terms of sexual self-disclosure, under low cost conditions, positive
mood participants should be more willing to disclose deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior
than when in neutral or negative mood state; but, under high cost conditions, positive mood
participants should be less willing to disclose such fantasies/behaviors than when in a neutral or
negative mood state.
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Negative mood states also influence risky decision making, albeit in different ways than
positive mood. The next section reviews research examining negative mood states and risky
decision making under both low and high cost conditions.
The Role of Negative Mood in Risky Decision Making. A review of the mood and
risky decision making literature indicates that negative mood states, such as sadness, have not
received comparable research attention as positive mood states, such as happiness. Nonetheless,
it is generally agreed that individuals in a negative mood tend to overestimate the probability of a
negative outcome (Gasper & Clore, 1998; Johnson & Tversky, 1983) while concurrently
underestimating the probability of a positive outcome (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer,
Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Wright & Bower, 1992). Moreover, according to the
“mood-repair hypothesis”, individuals in a negative mood are motivated to bolster their mood
and will engage in behavior consistent with this goal (Isen & Geva, 1987). However, what this
means in terms of risky decision making depends on the individual’s perception of the potential
cost involved.
Low cost conditions. The mood-repair hypothesis would suggest that individuals in a
negative mood state are motivated to “feel better” (Isen & Geva, 1987). Hence, individuals in a
negative mood state may engage in risky decision making when there is a potential pay-off, since
the material reward is likely to elevate their mood. However, under low cost conditions where
there is little to no material reward, they have nothing to gain, particularly in terms of mood, by
engaging in risky decision making. As noted previously, individuals in a negative mood state
tend to overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome (Gasper & Clore, 1998; Johnson &
Tversky, 1983). Accordingly, under low cost conditions, individuals in a negative mood state
should engage in more conservative risky decision making since they overestimate the likelihood
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of a negative outcome (even if it is negligible), and they have nothing to gain by engaging in
risky decision making.
However, the limited research examining the effect of negative mood on risky decision
making under low cost conditions has provided inconsistent findings. The first studies in this
area, discussed earlier, examined the effect of mood state on probability estimations of possible
negative life events (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & Bower, 1992). Johnson and Tversky
(1983) found that undergraduate participants induced into a negative mood state (by reading
about a fatality) were subsequently more likely to display a global increase in risk perception for
a variety of fatalities, regardless of whether it was similar to the one depicted in the mood
induction scenario. Similarly, Wright and Bower (1992) found that undergraduate participants
induced into a negative mood state, via sad autobiographical recollections, perceived a range of
negative life experiences as more likely to happen to them than did positive mood participants.
In another study presented earlier, Yuen and Lee (2003) examined the relationship
between mood state and choice behavior in hypothetical “everyday” dilemmas. Participants
induced into a negative mood state via depressing movie clips were subsequently more likely to
make more conservative choices when deciding what to do in hypothetical, everyday life
“dilemmas”, than were participants induced into a neutral or positive mood state. The authors
suggested that a negative mood state likely led these participants’ to perceive the world as a more
threatening place, causing them to attempt to reduce losses in the hypothetical, yet risky,
situations posed to them. Similarly, Nygren (1998) found that negative mood participants were
less likely to gamble hypothetical credit hours than were positive mood participants. The results
of these two studies would suggest that under low cost conditions, negative mood states foster
more conservative risky decision making.
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In a series of three experiments examining the effect of mood on risky decision making in
hypothetical scenarios (i.e., under lost cost conditions), Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found
contrasting results to those of Yuen and Lee (2003) and Nygren (1998). In the first two
experiments, the researchers found that undergraduate participants induced into a sad mood by
reading a depressing vignette engaged in riskier decision making on both hypothetical gambling
and mock job selection tasks than anxious or neutral mood peers. In the third experiment,
participants were asked to make gambling choices for both themselves and others, and found that
the mood effects observed in the first two experiments persisted only when the participants were
making gambling choices for themselves.
Although theory would predict that under low cost conditions, negative mood states
should facilitate more risk-averse decision making, research findings suggest negative mood
states may lead to either risk-averse or risk-prone decision making. These disparities are not
easily reconciled, at least upon review of the literature, and more research will likely need to be
conducted in order to clarify these issues. Despite the inconsistent results, these studies can be
arguably subsumed under the category of low-cost given that they all involved either risk
estimation (with no actual self-relevant decision making required) or risky decision making in
hypothetical, and low cost situations. The next section will focus on the impact of negative mood
on risky decision making under high cost conditions.
High cost conditions. There is a paucity of experimental research examining the effect
of negative mood on risky decision making in high-cost situations, but the limited and relevant
literature overlaps considerably with behavoiural economics. The literature that does exist is
largely focused on managerial or organizational-level decision making that is not necessarily
self-relevant for the decision maker in question (e.g., Kliger & Levy, 2002; Mittal & Ross,
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1998); the results may not be generalizable to self-relevant risky decision making as discussed in
this paper. Nonetheless, the mood repair hypothesis (Isen & Geva, 1987) would suggest that
individuals in a negative mood state are impelled to alleviate the unpleasantness of a negative
mood state by engaging in some reparative action (Caruso & Shafir, 2006). Thus, individuals in a
negative mood state are more likely to engage in risky decision making if the potential payoff is
perceived to be desirable, and hence, will elevate their mood (Caruso & Shafir, 2006). Research
findings have generally supported this idea. In a study mentioned previously, Nygren (1998)
found that participants induced into a positive mood state by receipt of a small gift of candy and
reading positive statements, were more conservative when gambling for tangible rewards in the
form of blank video cassettes or credit hours. Stated another way, negative mood participants
were more risky in their decision making compared to their positive mood peers.
Indeed, clinical literature has noted that individuals in negative mood states often engage
in what would seem to be “self-defeating” or “self-destructive” behavior (Leith & Baumeister,
1996), such as gambling (Peck, 1986) or abusing alcohol (Golding, Burnam, Benjamin, & Wells,
1992), in an attempt to “feel good.” Ostensibly, individuals in a negative mood state are
motivated to engage in these risky decisions and behaviors, despite the potential high costs
involved, because of the potential “feel good” (hedonic) rewards and temporary elevation in
mood resulting from these activities.
In summary, under high cost conditions wherein a potential pay-off is possible,
individuals in a negative mood are more likely to engage in riskier decision making and
behavior. The mood repair hypothesis suggests this is motivated by the individual’s attempt to
decrease the aversiveness of a negative mood state through the positive hedonic effects of the
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potential pay-off; an assertion generally supported by the limited experimental and clinical
research in this area.
Although no studies have to date have explored the influence of mood and cost
perception on disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, two studies has examined the
affect of mood on non-sexual self-disclosure.
Mood and “Risky” Non-Sexual Self-Disclosure
There is little research examining the effect of mood on self-disclosure of sensitive
information, such as disclosure of sexual fantasies and behaviors. One exception is a study that
investigated the effect of mood state on disclosure of personal information in an interview
context with an opposite-sex peer. In this study, Cunningham (1988) found that participants
induced to a positive mood state were more likely to make “medium” and “high” intimacy
disclosures related to personal and social information, such as hobbies and religious interests, to
an opposite-sex peer than were participants induced to a negative mood state. However, there
were no between mood condition differences for “low” intimacy disclosures. Therefore, this
would suggest participants were more willing to make “riskier” personal disclosures to an
opposite-sex peer when in a positive mood state than when in a negative mood state
(Cunningham, 1988).
Similarly, in a series of studies conducted by Forgas (2011), it was found that participants
induced to a positive (happy) mood state were more likely to disclose a greater depth and breadth
of intimate information (e.g., financial, body, health) in response to a hypothetical and computermediated interaction with a peer than were participants induced to a negative mood state.
However, disclosures in Cunningham’s (1988) and Forgas' (2011) studies were made in
the context of face-to-face, computer-mediated, or imagined dyadic interactions with a peer and
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not on a research survey, introducing interpersonal dynamics that are not present when
disclosures are made on a survey. More importantly, the “risky” disclosures in the both studies
appear to be relatively benign compared to the sexual self-disclosures required in the present
study (e.g., pedophilic fantasy) and may not have been perceived as “costly.” Therefore, it is
unknown whether his findings of mood effects on risky disclosures will extend to the disclosure
of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior in the current study. Disclosing deviant sexual fantasies
and/or behavior is potentially more stigmatizing than making disclosures about hobbies, religious
interests, or finances. In fact, research has demonstrated that sexual fantasies and behavior are
one type of information that is particularly likely to be underreported, or not reported at all, due
to the nature of the subject matter (Catania, McDermott, & Pollack, 1986; Catania et al., 1990).
Sexual Self-Disclosure as Risky Decision Making
Making the decision to disclose personal information of a sexual nature is a potentially
costly venture, since making such disclosures puts one at risk of negative social judgment and
stigmatization by others (Catania et al., 1990). Research has shown that individuals are least
likely to disclose information that is perceived to be socially unacceptable (Pennebaker, 1989),
transgressive (Pasupathi, McLean, & Weeks, 2009), or socially deviant (Catania et al., 1986) for
fear of social disapproval or rejection (Catania et al., 1990; Vrij, Nunkoosing, Paterson,
Ooosterwegel, & Soukara, 2002). Research has found the material most likely to be
underreported or non-disclosed is that relating to abortion, substance use, sexual and domestic
abuse, delinquent behavior, and sexual fantasies and behavior, due to the potentially
stigmatizing nature of the material (Fendrich & Vaughn, 1995; Kelly & McKillop, 1996;
Sandberg, Rotheram-Borus, Bradlery, & Martin, 1988; Smith, Adler, & Tschann, 1999). With
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respect to sexual fantasies and behavior, those perceived as deviant, are most likely to be
underreported or not reported at all (Catania et al., 1986; Catania et al., 1990).
A sexual fantasy is generally considered to become deviant when it contains content that
is "marked by a significant departure from the behavioural norms of society" (Langevin, Lang, &
Curnoe, 1998). In other words, this would include any fantasy that incorporates socially
inappropriate, nonconsensual, and/or illegal sexual content (Maniglio, 2011). It is important to
note that this definition does not include statistical deviance, since many sexual fantasies may
occur relatively frequently in the general population, but would still be considered "normatively"
deviant.
It stands to reason then, that disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors may
lead to adverse social repercussions, and therefore, can be considered a type of risky decision
making. If one chooses to disclose a deviant sexual fantasy and/or behavior, one runs the risk of
social rejection or disapproval. In a research setting, where participants are assured of
confidentiality and anonymity, the perceived cost for making such disclosures is likely
attenuated or negated (Meston et al., 1998). However, if the conditions of reporting are
conducted in an interpersonal context (such as an interview), or may have been initially reported
in an anonymous fashion but later require in-person follow-up, the perceived cost may be high.
As such, the “cost” in making disclosures of deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior is likely
contingent upon the conditions under which they are made. Additional factors, other than mood
and cost perception, have also been found to influence sexual self-disclosure, such as ethnicity,
gender, and personality traits.
Moderators of Sexual Self-Disclosure
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Research has shown that a variety of demographic and personality variables can influence
sexual self disclosure, with some variables exerting more influence than others.
Ethnicity. Little research has been conducted on the moderating effect of ethnicity on
sexual self-disclosure (Catania et al., 1996). Nonetheless, at least in interview contexts, Hispanic
men appear to be less willing to disclose sexual behavior in general (Catania et al., 1990) but
more willing to overreport certain sexual behaviors, than men of other ethnic groups (Catania et
al., 1990). In addition, Black men were more willing to disclose non-condom use in an interview
than were White men when the question was worded in a supportive way (Catania, 1999).
Gender. In general, men tend to disclose less than women (Dindia & Allen, 1992).
However, when it comes to sexual self-disclosure, men may be more likely to disclose
information related to genital-focused questions than women, whereas women may be more selfdisclosive when answering relationship-related questions. Durant, Carey, and Schroder (2002)
found that in a sample of undergraduates, female participants were more likely to “prefer to not
respond” to questions inquiring about sensitive behaviors (such as substance use, sex, and illegal
behavior) on an anonymous survey, or to terminate the survey earlier than male participants.
Personality. The role of personality factors in self-disclosure has been debated in the
literature and findings have been generally inconsistent (Omarzu, 2000). Although Big-Five
personality constructs, such as extraversion, agreeableness, and openness, have been found to be
related to self-disclosure in general and sexual self-disclosure more specifically (e.g., Stokes,
1987), Meston and colleagues (1998) found that impression management was more important in
accounting for sexual self-disclosure than were personality dimensions. Nonetheless, one
personality construct that has been found to reliably predict sexual self-disclosure is erotophilia.
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Erotophilia. Erotophilia is a personality construct that reflects a comfort with sexually
themed topics and material (Catania et al., 1986; Durant et al., 2002). Not surprisingly,
individuals who endorse a higher comfort level with various sexual topics, i.e., endorse higher
levels of erotophilia, have been found to be more sexually self-disclosive (Catania et al., 1986;
Durant et al., 2002).
Trait emotion. Trait emotion refers to the degree to which an individual is inclined to
experience the corresponding emotional state or mood. For example, if an individual is
frequently prone to experiencing states of sadness, he or she would be described as high in trait
sadness or depression. It has been suggested that individuals high on a trait emotion are more
susceptible to the effects of the corresponding emotional state on their decision making. An
individual high on trait depression is likely to already possess a pessimistic worldview, which
would only be enhanced when a negative mood state is experienced (Butler & Mathews, 1983;
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Moreover, Damasio (as cited in Gasper & Clore, 1998) suggested that
individuals high on a trait emotion may not have their decision making influenced by an
opposite-state mood because it is inconsistent with how they typically feel. For example, an
individual who feels happy much of the time (i.e., high on trait happiness) may not have his or
her decision making influenced by a sad mood state to the same degree that an individual high on
trait depression would, since it as at odds with how they typically feel and therefore, make
decisions.
Accordingly, trait emotion or chronic mood disturbance, such as a mood disorder, could
serve as a potentially confounding variable to the “pure” effect of a temporary mood state on
risky decision making. In the case of sexual self-disclosure, trait emotion may influence the
degree to which a participant experiences mood-specific effects on their decision to disclose and
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how much to disclose. For example, individuals high on trait depression may experience
compounded negative mood state effects on sexual self-disclosure, compared to individuals low
in trait depression and in a negative mood state.
Summary
The influence of mood on self-disclosure of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior may
depend on a complex interplay between mood valence and perception of cost. Under low cost
conditions, such as when responses are confidential and anonymous, individuals in a positive
mood state may be more disclosive than individuals in a neutral or negative mood state. Under
high cost conditions, such as when confidentiality and anonymity are not assured, individuals in
a positive mood state may be less disclosive than individuals in a neutral or negative mood state.
After a review of the relevant literature, it remains unclear how a negative mood state will
influence self-disclosure patterns of deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, regardless of
perceived cost, since individuals have nothing to gain by making such disclosures. Additional
factors such as gender, ethnicity, and personality traits, may also influence disclosure of deviant
sexual fantasies and behavior.

Study Hypotheses
The present study examined the differential effect of mood on rates of self-disclosure of
deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, as a function of the perceived cost of making such
disclosures. Three primary hypotheses are forwarded for each of the two cost conditions.
It is predicted that under low cost conditions:
1. a greater number of participants will endorse experiencing any deviant sexual

fantasies/behaviors when in a positive mood condition than when in neutral or
negative mood conditions.
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2. of the subgroup of individuals who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual

fantasies, those in the positive mood condition will report a greater number of
deviant sexual fantasies/behaviors (i.e., will endorse a higher number of fantasies
as “present” than “absent”) than those in the neutral or negative mood conditions.
3. of the subgroup of individuals who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual

fantasies/behaviors, those in the positive mood condition will disclose higher total
mean frequency rates of deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors than those in the
neutral or negative mood conditions.
It is also predicted that under high cost conditions:
4. a lower number of participants will endorse experiencing any deviant sexual

fantasies/beheviors when in a positive mood condition than when in neutral or
negative mood conditions.
5. of the subgroup of participants who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual

fantasies, those in the positive mood condition will report a lower number of
deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors (i.e., will endorse a lower number as
“present” than “absent”) than those in the neutral or negative mood conditions.
6. of the subgroup of participants who endorse the presence of any deviant sexual

fantasies/behaviors, those in the positive mood condition will disclose lower total
mean frequency rates of deviant sexual fantasies and behaviors than those in the
neutral or negative mood conditions.
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD

Participants
Eligibility criteria. All participants were required to be of adult age (i.e., over 18 years
old) and have access to the internet in order to complete the online survey. Community
participants (i.e., those taking part in the full study) were also required to have a PayPal account
(an encrypted online payment service) and a debit/credit card in order receive compensation
($12.50) for their participation.
Phase 1 (Pilot Phase). The pilot sample was recruited to test the efficacy of the mood
induction and cost perception manipulation stimuli; this sample was recruited through an
Introductory Psychology course and participants were awarded one course credit for completion
of the survey.In total, 81 undergraduate students (X age = 19.19; SD = 1.42; n = 79) were
recruited. This sample was composed of 63.3% females and 36.7% males (all cisgender for both
genders). In terms of ethnic composition, 16.5% identified as White, 13.9% as Black, 50.6% as
Latino, 13.9% as Asian/Pacific Islander, and 5.1% as "Other." Finally, with respect to sexual
orientation, 86.5% identified as "Heterosexual," 3.8% as "Bisexual," 5.8% as "Homosexual" and
3.8% as "Unsure." Note, the sexual orientation item was subsequently modified to include two
additional anchor points ("Mostly heterosexual" and "Mostly homosexual") for Phase 2 of the
study in order to better reflect a continuum of sexuality.
Phase 2. The study design is a 3 (mood: happy vs. neutral vs. sad) X 2 (cost perception:
Low vs. High) factorial design. A power analysis conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that in order to achieve a power of approximately .90 and a
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moderate effect size of .20, a sample size of 420 participants (74 per condition) would be
required.
In total, 338 community adult (X age = 32.10; SD = 12.24) community participants were
recruited. Data for seven individuals were removed because they failed to answer any items on
the survey, leaving a total sample of 331. This sample was composed of 59.3% females (194
cisgender, 1 transgender) and 40.7% males (all cisgender). In terms of ethnic composition,
42.4% identified as White, 24.8% as Black, 14.5% as Latino, 10.9% as Asian/Pacific Islander,
and 7.3% as "Other." Finally, with respect to sexual orientation, 72.8% identified as "Completely
heterosexual," 14.2% as "Mostly heterosexual," 6.3% as "Bisexual," 1.5% as "Mostly
homosexual," 4.2% as "Completely homosexual," and none endorsed "Not sure."
Procedure
Undergraduate participants learned of the study through an established research
experience program (REP) that is offered as an option for course credit. The REP website
provided a study description and a contact email address. Students interested in the study were
prompted to email the researcher directly to enroll. Community participants were also advised
to contact the researcher directly if interested in research participation; however in an effort to
reduce self-selection bias, the advertisements did not disclose the nature of the study. After
community participants made the initial email inquiry about the study, they were provided with a
description of the study. In this way, drop-out based on the nature of the study, could be
monitored. Only two participants declined to participate in the study when informed of the
sexual nature of the survey; an additional two participants declined/were unable to participate
because they did not feel comfortable providing a debit/credit card information to a third-party
website (i.e., PayPal)/did not have a debit/credit card.
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After contacting the researcher by email, each participant (whether undergraduate or
community) was randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. Each participant was provided
a unique, randomly-generated 5-digit ID number and the weblink unique to their respective
condition. Each of the six weblinks (one per condition) contained identical online versions of the
questionnaire battery, except for differences in mood manipulation and cost perception stimuli.
In other words, participants filled out the same questionnaires, but were presented with a
different version of the consent form (for manipulation of cost perception) and a different mood
induction stimulus depending on their cell assignment.
Survey Completion. Once participants clicked on the weblink provided to them by the
researcher, they were redirected to the survey. Online data collection was conducted through a
reputable survey data collection website, SurveyMonkey.com, to ensure security and anonymity.
Participants were prompted to enter their unique 5-digit participant number at the beginning of
the survey.
At the end of the survey, participants read a debriefing page that explained the purpose of
the study and thanked them for their participation. Participants were then asked to contact the
researcher again via email with their participant ID number for payment. Undergraduate
participants were then granted one course credit for their participation through the REP website.
Community participants were sent a response email including a link to PayPal, a secure and
confidential online payment site. Community participants clicked on the PayPal link and were
credited $12.50 to their debit/credit card through the PayPal system; they also received a
confirmation email from the researcher and PayPal indicating their payment had been processed.
It should be noted that all of the cost and mood manipulation stimuli and questionnaire
measures were presented in a fixed sequence given that mood manipulations are time sensitive.
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Although it is often recommended that questionnaires be counterbalanced in order to control for
order effects, it was determined that presenting the variables of critical interest in a
counterbalanced sequence could possibly attenuate the effect of the mood manipulation given
that mood changes over time. Therefore, cost and mood manipulation stimuli and questionnaires
were presented in a fixed sequence.
Independent Variables and Manipulation Checks. After entering their ID number,
participants were presented with one of the two following versions of the consent form
depending on which cost perception condition they had been assigned:
Perception of Low Cost. Participants were presented with a standard consent form with
assurances that all responses will be entirely anonymous and confidential. In this way,
considerations of cost for disclosing deviant sexual fantasies and/or behavior were ostensibly
negated. Once participants read the consent form, they clicked on a radio button to indicate their
consent or non-consent to proceed. Manipulation check: Participants completed a threequestion true/false quiz to ensure they attended to and understood the content of the consent
form, including: their responses were completely confidential and anonymous, their data was
identified by their ID number only, and only members of the research team would have access to
their data (See Appendix A).
Perception of High Cost. Participants were presented with the same consent form as in
the Low Cost condition. However, they were also instructed that although answers will be kept
strictly confidential, they may be “randomly selected” to come in at a later date to conduct a
follow-up interview about their responses with a member of the research team. In addition, the
consent form advised them that because the selection process is random, selection for follow-up
is not contingent upon their responses. As such, they were told they will be asked to provide an

29
email address for contact purposes at the end of the survey if selected for follow-up; however, no
participant was actually asked to provide an email address at the end of the survey and no
follow-up interviews were conducted. These instructions were intended to increase the salience
of cost considerations (i.e., possible social stigmatization or judgment by the research
interviewer if they are selected), and allowed us to collect data on participant drop-out rates after
reading the instructions. Once participants read the consent form, they clicked on a radio button
to indicate their consent or non-consent to proceed. Manipulation check: Participants completed
a three-question true/false quiz to ensure they understood that: they may be selected at random
for an in-person follow-up interview with a member of the research team; the selection process
was done by lottery; and if selected, they would be asked to provide an email address at the end
of the survey (See Appendix B).
After reading the appropriate version of the consent form and completing the short threequestion quiz (the cost perception manipulation check), participants were then asked to fill out
three demographic questions (gender, ethnicity, and age). It was felt that including these few
demographic questions after the cost manipulation would allow us to, at the least, have basic
demographic data if participants subsequently dropped out before completion. The remaining
demographic questions that were less central to the hypotheses were placed at the end of the
survey and include marital/relationship status, year in college, first language, and years living in
the United States. The final questionnaire also asked about psychiatric history, abuse history, and
legal history. Initially, individuals who reported a current diagnosis of a mood disorder were
going to be excluded from data analysis given that current or chronic mood disturbance may
confound the effects of a temporary mood induction; however, there data was retained after
finding that their inclusion did not significantly alter the results.
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Mood Induction Protocol. Following completion of the first three demographic
questions, participants were presented with a mood induction stimulus unique to their assigned
mood condition. The mood induction stimuli are similar to those used in previous studies (e.g.,
Forgas, 2011; Wright & Bower, 1992) and are as follows:
Neutral (Control) Mood. Those in the neutral (or control) condition were asked to list a
chronological record of activities for a typical weekday, providing as much detail as possible
(e.g., what time do you usually get up, what do you usually do to get ready in the morning, etc.).
Note, a "typical" day was asked about instead of a recent day during the past week, because the
former was believed to be less likely to be associated with a potential "bad" or "good" day,
which could inadvertently induce its own mood, confounding the neutral mood manipulation.
Manipulation check: Participants were also asked to rate how they currently feel according to
three unipolar affective rating scales: happiness, sadness, and relaxed; ranging from 1 (“Not at all
happy/sad/relaxed”) to 10 (“Extremely happy/sad/relaxed”) (See Appendix C).
Positive (Happy) Mood. Participants in the positive mood condition were asked to recall
their happiest memory, and asked to write down a detailed narrative of it, with particular
attention to what about the event made them happy. Participants were also asked to rate how
happy this memory made them at the time that the event took place along a 10-point scale (1 =
“not at all happy”, 10 = “Extremely happy”). Manipulation check: Participants also rated how
they currently felt according to the same three unipolar affective rating scales: happiness,
sadness, relaxed; ranging from 1 (“Not at all happy/sad/relaxed”) to 10 (“Extremely
happy/sad/relaxed”) (See Appendix D).
Negative (Sad) Mood. Participants in the negative mood condition were asked to recall
their saddest memory, and asked to write down a detailed narrative of it, with particular attention

31
to what about the event mad them sad. Participants were also asked to rate how sad this memory
made them at the time that the event took place along a 10-point scale (1 = “Not at all sad”, 10 =
“Extremely sad”). Manipulation check: Participants also rated how they currently felt according
to the same three unipolar affective rating scales: happiness, sadness, relaxed; ranging from 1
(“Not at all happy/sad/relaxed”) to 10 (“Extremely happy/sad/relaxed”) (See Appendix E).
Measures
Following the mood induction stimulus, participants completed questionnaires in the
listed sequence, which were estimated to take between 55-75 minutes to complete.
Dependent Variables.
Sexual Fantasy Questionnaire (SFQ; Gray, Watt, Hassan, & MacCulloch, 2003). The
SFQ is a 279-item questionnaire that asks participants to rate the frequency of 93 sexual
fantasies, and the frequency with which they have engaged in the corresponding sexual behavior,
and the pleasure they derive from it, if applicable. Fantasy, behaviors and the pleasure derived
from engaging in the behaviors, are all rated along a 4-point numerically anchored scale;
however, the anchor labels vary. Fantasy item anchors are labeled as follows: 0 = “No sexual
interest”, 1 = “Slight sexual interest”, 2 = “Have fantasized about frequently”, and 3 = “Cannot
get it out of my mind.” Behavior item anchors are labeled as: 0 = “Never done”, 1 = “Have done
once or twice”, 2 = “Have done several times”, and 3 = “Have done many times.” Pleasure items
are labeled as: 0 = “Didn’t enjoy”, 1 = “Enjoyed slightly”, 2 = “Enjoyed moderately”, and 3 =
“Enjoyed greatly.”
For the purposes of the current study, several modifications were made to the SFQ. First,
some fantasy items and their corresponding behavior items were removed because of vague
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language. For example, one item read “Romantic sexual contact with somebody you know,”
which does not specify an act nor a relationship with the “somebody.” Additional fantasy items,
and their behaviors, were removed due to lack of endorsement in our previous research (Maile,
Maile, & Allwood, 2009). For example, no previous participants endorsed fantasizing about
“Body piercing” or having “Sex with somebody you don’t like.” Other single fantasy and
behavior items were bifurcated to specify whether the fantasy involved the act with a sexual
partner or a stranger. Finally, some items were reworded to improve readability for our target
participants. For example, the word “whilst” was changed to “while”, and “sex in toilets with
strangers” was changed to “sex in bathrooms with strangers.” In addition, the pleasure items
were removed and replaced with more behaviorally based masturbation items. Therefore,
participants rated both the frequency with which they experience and masturbate to fantasies (the
latter of which will now be referred to as masturbatory fantasies), and the frequency with which
they engage in the corresponding behavior. In total, the modified SFQ used in the present study
was comprised of 252 items across three domains: 84 fantasy items, 84 masturbatory fantasy
items, and 84 behavior items.
Rating scales were changed from 4-point to 5-point scales to provide a wider range of
values and increase sensitivity. In addition, a “Prefer to Not Respond” option was added to all
items. Also, the wording of the anchor labels was modified to increase consistency across the
scales. The revised fantasy item anchors are: 0 = “Have never fantasized about”, 1 = “Have
fantasized about once or twice”, 2 = “Have fantasized about several times”, 3 = “Have fantasized
about frequently”, 4 = “Have fantasized about very frequently.” The masturbation item anchors
are: 0 = “Never masturbated”, 1 = “Have masturbated about once or twice”, 2 = “Have
masturbated about several times”, 3 = “Have masturbated about frequently”, 4 = “Have
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masturbated about very frequently.” The revised behavior items are: 0 = “Have never done”, 1
= “Have done once or twice”, 2 = “Have done several times”, 3 = “Have done frequently”, 4 =
“Have done very frequently” (See Appendix F). No data were published by the original authors
regarding the SFQ’s test-retest reliability or internal consistency, nor was data provided
regarding the factor structure of the scale. For the current sample, a cronbach’s alpha value of .98
was obtained for the overall scale; and.96, .97, and .94 for the subscales of sexual fantasies,
masturbatory fantasies, and behaviours, respectively. Internal consistency values of this degree
are considered “excellent” (George & Mallery, 2003).
Covariates.
Sexual Opinion Survey (SOS; Fisher, Byrne, White, & Kelley, 1988). The SOS is a 21item measure assessing an individual’s attitude toward sexuality along a negative-positive
continuum (see Appendix G). This construct has also been called “erotophilia-erotophobia” in
previous studies. Participants are asked to rate the sexual statements on a 7-point Likert scale (1
= Strongly Disagree to 7= Strongly Agree). Total scores can then be calculated, with higher
scores reflecting greater discomfort with sexual themed material and topics (i.e., greater
erotophobia). Previous studies have noted alpha coefficients ranging from .80 to .90, and testretest reliability of .80. For the current study, an alpha coefficient of .87 was obtained, suggesting
“good” internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).
Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI; Argyle, Martin, & Crossland, 1989). The OHI is a
29-item self-report measure that assesses trait happiness (see Appendix H). Items are rated along
a 7-point Likert scale with values ranging from “1” (Disagree) to “7” (Agree). Items scores are
summed for a total score, with higher scores reflecting greater trait happiness. Previous studies
have noted alpha coefficients ranging from .64-.87, and a test-retest reliability of .78. For the
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current study, an alpha coefficient of .93 was obtained, suggesting an “excellent” internal
consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).
State-Trait Depression Scales, Trait Subscale (T-DEP; Spielberger, Carretero-Dios,
De los Santos-Roig, & Buela-Casal, 2002). This subscale of the T-DEP consists of 10 selfreport items tapping trait depression (see Appendix I). Responses are rated along a 4-point
Likert scale, with values ranging from 1 ("Almost Never") to 4 ("Almost Always") and higher
scores indicating greater trait depression. In its initial psychometric validation, this subscale
evidenced a high internal consistency of .90, and an eight-week test-retest reliability of .78. For
the current study, an alpha coefficient of .91 was obtained, suggesting “excellent” internal
consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Short Form C Version (M-C Form C;
Reynolds, 1982): The M-C Form C version is a condensed 13-item version of the original 33item questionnaire (see Appendix J). It is a self-report questionnaire that measures the extent to
which the participant’s response tendency is to “fake good.” The participant responds “true” or
“false” to the 13 items to yield a total score, with higher scores reflecting a tendency to “fake
good.” Reynolds (1982) reported acceptable reliability with a Kuder-Richardson 20 estimate of
.76. For the current study, an alpha coefficient of .60 was obtained, suggesting “questionable”
internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

The following subsections detail how potential sources of data bias (i.e., outliers) were
identified and addressed, and discuss data analyses, including: testing if the experimental
manipulations (i.e., mood induction and cost perception) worked; the process for identifying
covariates to be included in analyses; and testing of the study's hypotheses. All data analyses
were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 19 (SPSS v. 19.0).
Data Analysis
It should be noted that the use of analyses of variance (ANOVA) and covariance
(ANCOVA), both parametric tests, typically require the use of interval scale data in order to
satisfy model assumptions of normality. The scale of measurement for the outcome variables in
the present study is not truly interval, but ordinal. Although the numerical rating scale is
interval—rated 0 to 4—the underlying metric is not. For example, the interval difference
between a rating of 1 (“once or twice”) and 2 (“several times”) is not equal to the difference
between a rating of 2 (“several times”) and 3 (“frequently”). There is some controversy over the
appropriate statistical procedure to use in this case, with some researchers suggesting a
preference for non-parametric tests (e.g., Mann-Whitney U test), while others defend the use of
more traditional parametric tests, such as analyses of variance (ANOVA) and covariance
(ANCOVA). Recent research suggests that analyses of variance and covariance are robust when
the outcome of interest employs a three-, four-, or five-level ordinal scale, which the current
study does, even with very small sample sizes (Sullivan & D’Agostino, 2003). Therefore, twoway ANCOVAs were deemed appropriate.
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Prior to conducting two-way analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) to test hypotheses
certain model assumptions for each of the ANCOVAs were examined, including normality, and
independence of the independent (treatment) variables and the covariates. Both assumptions
were satisfied for all models. Additional assumptions were tested as part of the statistical
analyses (i.e., homogeneity of variance and homogeneity of regression slopes for each of the
models), and again, these assumptions were satisfied unless specifically noted. A Sidak
correction was used for post-hoc testing for all ANCOVAs to control for family-wise error. A
Bonferroni correction is traditionally used to reduce alpha inflation introduced by multiple posthoc tests; however, in cases where power is of concern, a more liberal Sidak correction is
recommended (Field, 2013, p. 491). The results of the ANCOVAs are reported below, including
adjusted means and means, and effect sizes. Note, traditionally effect sizes are interpreted as
"small" when close to a value of .20, "medium" when close to a value of .50, and "large" when
close to a value of .80 (Field, 2011, p. 80).
Non-parametric chi-square tests were used to test certain hypotheses (i.e., comparing
number of individuals reporting any deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and
behvaiours) and are detailed below.
Data bias.
Outliers. Boxplots were constructed for each of the six outcome variables (i.e., number
and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors) and were
visually inspected to identify potential unique outlier cases (i.e., SPSS identifies values 1.5 times
the interquartile range [IQR] as potential outliers). Seventeen unique cases (i.e., participants),
were identified as having scores on one (or more) of the outcome variables at values exceeding
three standard deviations from the mean for an outcome variable(s).
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Data trimming. Scores that were identified as exceeding three standard deviations from
the mean for a given outcome variable were trimmed through winsorizing. Winsorized scores
(i.e., those that exceeded three standards deviations above the mean) were reduced from their
original value to a value equal to three standard deviations above the mean for that outcome
variable. This allowed retention of these participants’ data while reducing the extremity of their
scores, providing more accurate parameter estimates.
Manipulation Checks.
Mood induction. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) using post-hoc testing (with a
Bonferonni correction for controlling family-wise error) were conducted to test if state mood was
significantly different across mood conditions, and differed in the expected directions.
Participants rated their happiness as significantly different across mood conditions (F(2, 320) =
12.39, p < .001), such that participants in the positive mood condition rated their happiness (M =
6.49, SD = 1.93) as significantly higher than those in the negative mood condition (M = 5.00, SD
= 2.33); however, there was no significant difference in happiness ratings between the positive
and neutral mood (M = 6.05, SD = 2.42) conditions. Participants also rated their sadness as
significantly different across mood conditions (F(2, 320) = 22.57, p < .001), such that
participants in the negative mood condition rated their sadness (M = 5.11, SD = 2.59) as
significantly higher than those in the positive mood (M = 3.55, SD = 2.38) and neutral mood (M
= 3.00, SD = 2.24) conditions. There was no significant difference among mood conditions in
participants' ratings of relaxation (F(2, 320) = .905, p = .41).
Cost perception. Participants were asked three true/false questions pertaining to their
understanding of the anonymity/confidentiality of their answers in order to check if they attended
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to the cost perception manipulation. The large majority of participants (n = 319; 96.4%)
answered all three or two of the three questions in the expected direction, indicating that they
attended to the cost perception manipulation (n = 287; 86.7%, n = 32; 9.6%, respectively).
Covariates and the outcome variables. Bivariate correlations were calculated among all
potential continuous covariates, i.e., social desirability (Marlowe-Crowne Short Form C scores),
erotophilia (Sexual Opinion Survey scores), trait depression (Trait Depression subscale scores),
and trait happiness (Oxford Happiness Inventory scores); and the outcome variables (i.e., number
and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors), to test if a
relationship existed (see Table 2). Social desirability (i.e.,M-C scores) , erotophilia (SOS scores),
and trait depression (T-DEP) were significantly or marginally related to all outcome variables,
and therefore, included in subsequent analyses. Trait happiness (OHI scores) was not
significantly related to any of the outcome variables, and therefore, it was not included as a
covariate in any of the subsequent analyses. Table 2 consists of the correlation matrix among all
continuous covariates and the outcome variables. Social desirability and erotophilia were
moderately negatively correlated with number and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies,
masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors reported; while trait depression was weakly positively
correlated with these outcomes. Trait happiness was not significantly correlated with any of the
outcome variables.
With respect to potential covariates that are categorical (i.e., gender and ethnicity),
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to test for significant differences in the number
or frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, or behaviors. No significant
differences were found between males and females (very few individuals identified as
transgendered, and therefore, were not included in this analysis), or among different ethnic
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groups, on any of the outcome variables. Therefore, gender and ethnicity were excluded as
covariates from subsequent analyses.
Hypothesis Testing.
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies,
and behaviors (Hypotheses 1 and 4). In order to calculate the number of participants who
endorsed the presence of any deviant sexual fantasies, all fantasy items were dichotomized into
dummy variables, such that if participants endorsed “never” experiencing a given fantasy, it was
coded as “absent” (0); if the participant endorsed experiencing a given fantasy at a frequency
other than “never,” it was coded as “present” (1). A chi-square analysis was then conducted to
investigate whether the number of participants who endorsed the presence of any deviant sexual
fantasies differed across the six conditions. This process was repeated for masturbatory fantasies
and behaviors. In general, it appeared fewer happy or sad participants disclosed the presence of
deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviours under high cost conditions (i.e.,
when assurances of anonymity were not guaranteed) than when under low cost conditions (i.e.,
anonymity was assured) (see Figure 1); a more detailed analysis by domain is provided below.
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual fantasies. A chi-square analysis
found that mood or cost perception did not affect the percentage (number) of participants who
disclosed deviant sexual fantasies, χ2 (5, N =282) = 7.55, p = .18. In total, 90.8% of participants
reported experiencing at least one deviant sexual fantasy. Cell assignment rates were as follows:
Low Cost Perception + Positive Mood (LowPos) = 17.0% (48); High Cost Perception + Positive
Mood (HighPos) = 13.5% (38); Low Cost Perception + Neutral Mood (LowNeut) = 15.6% (44);
High Cost Perception + Neutral Mood (HighNeut) = 16.7% (47); Low Cost Perception +
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Negative Mood (LowNeg) = 16.0% (45); High Cost Perception + Negative Mood (HighNeg) =
12.1% (34). For those that endorsed the presence of any deviant sexual fantasies, the two most
commonly endorsed types were masochistic (81.3%; e.g., “being bound or tied up”) and sadistic
(76.6%; e.g., “dominating/controlling a sexual partner”), and the least commonly endorsed was
pedophilic (4.3%; i.e., young boys or girls “age 10 and under”). More specifically, males
reported exhibitionistic (83.5%; e.g., “sex in public places”) and sadistic (79.6%) as the most
common, and females reported masochistic (90.2%) and exhibitionistic (79.7%) as the most
common. The least commonly reported deviant sexual fantasy was pedophilic for both males
(8.7%) and females (1.3%).
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies. A chisquare analysis found a non-significant trend for the effect of mood and cost perception on the
percentage (number) of participants who disclosed deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies, χ2 (5, N
=284) = 9.36, p = .10. In total, 77.8% of participants reported masturbating to at least one deviant
sexual fantasy. Cell assignment rates were as follows: LowPos = 13.0% (37); HighPos = 10.6%
(30); LowNeut = 14.4% (41); HighNeut = 13.0% (37); LowNeg = 15.8% (45); HighNeg = 10.9%
(31). The two most commonly endorsed masturbatory fantasy types were masochistic (68.4%)
and sadistic (66.0%), and the least commonly endorsed was pedophilic (2.7%). Males reported
sadistic (71.8%) and exhibitionistic (67.0%) as the most common, and females reported
masochistic (75.2%) and sadistic (62.1%) as the most common. The least commonly reported
masturbatory fantasy was pedophilic for both males (6.8%) and females (0.0%).
Number of participants endorsing any deviant sexual behaviours. A chi-square analysis
found that mood or cost perception did not affect the percentage (number) of participants who
disclosed deviant sexual behaviours, χ2 (5, N =289) = 8.41, p = .14. In total, 83.4% of participants
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reported engaging in at least one deviant sexual behavior. Cell assignment rates were as follows:
LowPos = 14.9% (43); HighPos = 10.4% (30); LowNeut = 14.5% (42); HighNeut = 15.6% (45);
LowNeg = 15.6% (45); HighNeg = 12.5% (36). The two most commonly endorsed types of
deviant sexual behaviours were masochistic (67.2%) and sadistic (66.0%), and the least
commonly endorsed was pedophilic (0.8%). Males reported sadistic (68.0%) and exhibitionistic
(66.0%) behavior as the most common, and females reported masochistic (75.2%) and sadistic
(64.7%) as the most common. The least commonly reported deviant sexual behaviour was
pedophilic for both males (1.9%) and females (0.0%).
Number of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors
(Hypotheses 2 and 5). The subsample of participants who endorsed the presence of any deviant
sexual fantasies (i.e., approximately 91% of the total sample) were included in subsequent
analyses. In order to calculate the number of deviant sexual fantasies endorsed by a participant,
the number of fantasies endorsed as “present” by a participant were tabulated to provide a total
number of deviant sexual fantasies. The same tabulations were conducted for masturbatory
fantasies and behaviors, providing a total number of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory
fantasies, and behaviors for each participant.
Number of deviant sexual fantasies. A two-way analysis of covariance (two-way
ANCOVA) was conducted to test for main and interaction effects of mood and cost perception
on disclosure of number of deviant sexual fantasies, controlling for social desirability,
erotophilia, and trait depression (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2). There was no significant main effect
for mood on number of sexual fantasies disclosed, F(2, 204) = .05, p = .95, ηp2 < .01. However,
there was a significant main effect of cost perception (F(1, 204) = 6.26, p = .01, ηp2 = .03), such
that participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed more deviant sexual fantasies (M
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= 11.58, SD = 8.20) than participants in the high cost perception condition (M = 9.25, SD =
7.73). There was no significant interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 204) = 1.33,
p = .27, ηp2 = .01) (see Figure 2).
Number of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies. Similarly, there was no significant
main effect for mood on number of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed, F(2, 198) =
1.30, p = .28, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a significant main effect for cost perception on the
number of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed (F(1, 198) = 7.82, p = .01, ηp2 = .04),
such that participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed more deviant sexual
masturbatory fantasies (M = 9.35, SD = 7.63) than participants in the high cost perception
condition (M = 7.11, SD = 6.48) (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2). There was no significant interaction
between mood and cost perception (F(2, 198) = .61, p = .55, ηp2 = .01) (See Figure 3).
Number of deviant sexual behaviors. There were no significant main effects for mood
(F(2, 197) = 1.97, p = .14, ηp2 = .02) or cost perception (F(1, 197) = .08, p = .78, ηp2 < .01) (See
Tables 5.1 and 5.2), or interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 197) = .99, p = .37,
ηp2 = .01), on the number of deviant sexual behaviors disclosed (See Figure 4).
Frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors
(Hypotheses 3 and 6). In order to calculate total frequency scores, deviant sexual fantasy items
scores were retained in their original interval scale (i.e., 0 - 4) and summed to provide a total
frequency score for each participant. The same calculations were conducted for deviant sexual
masturbatory fantasies and behaviors.
Frequency of deviant sexual fantasies. There was no significant main effect for mood on
the total frequency of sexual fantasies disclosed, F(2, 211) = .02, p = .98, ηp2 < .01. However,
there was a significant main effect of cost perception (F(1, 211) = 5.43, p = .02, ηp2 = .03), such
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that participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed a total greater frequency score for
deviant sexual fantasies (M = 20.59, SD = 16.01) than participants in the high cost perception
condition (M = 15.86, SD = 14.60) (See Tables 6.1 and 6.2).. There was no significant
interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 211) = 1.59, p = .21, ηp2 = .02) on the
frequency of deviant sexual fantasies reported (See Figure 5).
Frequency of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies. Note, in this model, Levene’s test
suggested the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, F(5, 201) = 2.57, p = .03;
indicating that the variances among the cells may be significantly different. Inspection of the
standard deviations (from which the variances are derived) suggested the likely source of this
violation was the difference in variance between the low cost-neutral mood and high costnegative mood conditions. However, when sample sizes are large, as is the current sample,
Levene’s test can be overly sensitive in detecting unequal variances. In this case, using Hartley’s
Fmax test can produce a more accurate test of the assumption of homogeneity of variances (Field,
2013, p. 193). Results of the Hartley’s Fmax test found that the assumption was satisfied, Fmax(5,
33) = 2.52 (which did not exceed the critical value, Fmax-crit = 2.78). Therefore, the results of
ANCOVA are likely robust and interpretable. There was no significant main effect for mood on
the total frequency of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed, F(2, 198) = 2.19, p = .11,
ηp2 = .02. However, there was a significant main effect for cost perception on the total frequency
of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies disclosed (F(1, 198) = 6.35, p < .01, ηp2 = .03), such that
participants in the low cost perception condition disclosed a higher total frequency of deviant
sexual masturbatory fantasies (M = 16.64, SD = 14.53) than participants in the high cost
perception condition (M = 12.65, SD = 12.74) (See Tables 7.1 and 7.2). There was no significant
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interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 198) = 1.78, p = .17, ηp2 = .02) (See Figure
6).
Frequency of deviant sexual behaviors. There were no significant main effects for mood
(F(2, 197) = 1.31, p = .27, ηp2 = .01) or cost perception (F(1, 197) = .07, p = .80, ηp2 < .01) (See
Tables 8.1 and 8.2), or interaction between mood and cost perception (F(2, 197) = .85, p = .43,
ηp2 < .01) on total frequency scores of deviant sexual behaviors (See Figure 7).
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
This study examined the effects of mood and cost perception on the sexual selfdisclosure. We hypothesized that mood and cost perception (by proxy of
anonymity/confidentiality assurances) would separately, and through interaction with each other,
be associated with participants’ willingness to disclose deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory
fantasies, and behaviors.
Our hypotheses were not supported, however several interesting patterns emerged when
the data was examined through plots and figures. Approximately 90% of our sample endorsed
the presence of any deviant sexual fantasies and more than 75% endorsed engaging in deviant
sexual behavior. This is similar to our previous research findings with two undergraduate
samples, wherein approximately 83% endorsed the presence of deviant sexual fantasy (Maile, J.,
Maile, C., & Allwood, 2010) and approximately 70% endorsed deviant sexual behavior (Maile,
C., Maile, J., & Jeglic, 2009). We also found that approximately 78% of our sample reported
masturbating to a deviant sexual fantasy. It should be noted, there are few studies examining
prevalence rates of global deviant sexual fantasy in non-offending samples, and the majority of
these studies examine the prevalence of specific domains of deviant sexual fantasy or behaviour,
such as pedophilia or coerceive sexuality (i.e., rape-related). One study found that in a large
German community sample, approximately 59% endorsed the presence of a paraphilic fantasy,
approximately 48% endorsed a paraphilic masturbatory fantasy, and approximately 44% reported
engaging in a paraphilic behaviour (Ahlers, Schaefer, Mundt, Roll, Englert, et al., 2009).
Although the prevalence estimates in this study are lower than ours, this is likely because the
range of paraphilic (or deviant) fantasies and behaviours studied were more restricted in number
and focus compared to the current study. In another study specifically focusing on prevalence of
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deviant sexual behaviours, Templeman and Stinnett (1991) found that approximately 65% of an
relatively small male undergraduate sample reported engaging in some form of potentially illegal
sexual behaviour (e.g., frotteurism, voyeurism, coercive sex, etc.); however, this prevalence rate
is difficult to compare to the our result given the wider breadth of deviant sexual behaviours that
were canvassed in the current study, some of which were not potentially illegal (e.g., sadistic or
masochistic sex acts with consenting partners), thereby likely increasing our ability to detect the
presence of deviant sexual behaviours. Our results build on the findings of these previous studies
by providing a wider range of sexual fantasies and behaviours under study, including noncriminal ones and additional paraphilic ones (e.g., coercive sex).
Our findings also indicate that cost perception significantly influenced the number and
frequency of deviant sexual and masturbatory fantasies disclosed, such that participants who
perceived their responses to be anonymous and confidential, disclosed a greater number and
frequency of these compared to those whose anonymity/confidentiality was not assured. These
results are similar to previous research suggesting that individuals are more likely to disclose
information when assured of anonymity/confidentiality compared to when they are not (e.g.,
Durant et al. 2002, Smith & Tschann, 1999). Notably, this effect was not found with respect to
deviant sexual behaviors. It could be speculated that assurances of anonymity/confidentiality
only facilitate disclosure when the domain of disclosure is not too threatening. In other words,
participants were willing to admit to deviant sexual fantasies, and masturbating to these (both of
which are private events); but less likely willing to admit engaging in the corresponding sexual
act, which may involve another person(s) (a non-private event), and in some cases, be criminal in
nature (e.g., pedophilic or coercive sexual activity). This suggests that anonymity/confidentiality
may have an “upper limit” in its efficacy in facilitating disclosure, such that assurances of
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anonymity/confidentiality may promote disclosure of sensitive information to a point, but when
this threshold is passed (e.g., information that may lead to sanctions), the potential cost of
disclosure is perceived to be too high, negating the facilitative effect of
anonymity/confidentiality.
Mood, regardless of whether it was negative, neutral, or positive in valence, did not
significantly influence sexual self-disclosure. Participants disclosed approximately the same
number and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors
irrespective of mood. This is largely inconsistent with the findings of two studies examining the
effects of mood on non-sexual self-disclosure. Cunningham (1988) and Forgas (2011) both
found that positive mood facilitated disclosure of a greater breadth and/or depth of intimate
information of a non-sexual nature to same-aged peers. However, there are several
methodological differences between these two studies and the current study that make
interpretation of these differences difficult; both and Cunningham’s (1988) and Forgas’ (2011)
studies examined disclosure of relatively non-threatening information (compared to sexual selfdisclosure), and these disclosures were conducted with undergraduate participants (compared to
community participants), and involved disclosure in an interpersonal context (compared to on a
survey). In addition, the current study controlled for various variables, such as social desirability,
and trait mood, which the other studies did not.
Finally, in terms of our hypothesized interaction effects, positive mood did not
significantly interact with cost perception in influencing sexual self-disclosure. This may reflect
a genuine lack of interactive effect between mood and cost perception on sexual self-disclosure.
However, as noted above, this appears to contradict the findings of Cunningham (1988) and
Forgas (2011). Another possible explanation for the failure to find an effect for mood or an
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interaction effect between mood and cost perception is the relatively weak mood manipulation
(see Limitations Section below).
It should be noted that despite our failure to find a statistically meaningful effect of
mood, or interaction effect between mood and cost perception, an interesting and generally
consistent pattern of effects, although small and arguably trivial, was observed across all models
tested and merits mention. It appeared that happy and sad mood may actually slightly depress
initial willingness to disclose when the potential perceived cost for doing is high. This is
consistent with the literature on positive mood and risky decision making, such that individuals
in a positive mood tend to engage in less risky behavior when a potential outcome is perceived as
high in cost, as was the case in the present study. However, for those individuals who do
disclose, it appeared sad mood may actually slightly increase sexual self-disclosure, when the
perceived cost is low, but not when it is high. The pattern of findings for negative mood and
sexual self-disclosure in the current study is less straightforward and more difficult to interpret
given the mixed findings in the literature. In the present study, when examing the entire sample,
sad mood appeared to decrease initial willingness to sexually self-disclose; that is, fewer
participants in a sad mood disclosed the presence of any deviant sexual fantasy, masturbatory
fantasies, or behaviours. However, when the subsample of participants who disclosed the
presence of any deviant sexual fantasy, masturbatory fantasy, or behaviours was examined
separately, sad mood appeared to decrease sexual self-disclosure when the potential cost for
doing so was low, but increase some forms of sexual self-disclosure (i.e., deviant sexual fantasies
and masturbatory fantasies) slightly when the potential cost for doing so was high. The
experimental findings of previous studies offer little insight into this pattern of results; however,

49
theoretical work concerning the potential motivational role of negative mood in risky decision
making offers some insight.
The mood repair hypothesis would suggest individuals in a negative mood will only
engage in risky behavior if the risky situation has a potential to pay off—that is be high in
potential cost/gain (e.g., win a prize)—and improve their mood (Isen & Geva, 1987). In this
case, individuals in a negative mood (who tend to overestimate the probability of a negative
outcome) switch from a probability-focus to a cost-focus to guide decision making. In the
present study, participants had nothing material to gain for sexually self-disclosing, yet sad
participants disclosed slightly more than happy or neutral mood participants. Therefore, it would
appear that the mood repair hypothesis fails to account for this pattern. This apparent
contradiction can be resolved by examining the work of Bruyneel and colleagues (2009), who
suggested that the act of engaging in risky decision making itself (while in a negative mood)
provides hedonic value and a mood repairing function rather than the promise of a potential
material reward. According to this logic, under low cost conditions, where there is nothing “real”
to lose/gain, the act of risky decision making would not provide the same hedonic value (and
therefore mood repairing function) as would risky decision making under high cost conditions.
Therefore, individuals would theoretically focus on the probability of the outcome rather than the
cost/gain (which is negligible) to guide their decision making. Accordingly, it would be expected
that under low cost conditions, individuals in a negative mood would likely be more risk-averse
because there is little hedonic value to be gained from the risky decision. Conversely, under high
cost/gain conditions, individuals in a negative mood would theoretically switch from a
probability-focus to a cost-focus to guide decision making, resulting in riskier decision making in
pursuit of a hedonic reward and mood repair.
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Limitations
There are several limitations to the current study, including: sample size, the mood
induction procedure, the cost perception manipulation, the nature of the information being
disclosed, and the possible gender bias of the sexual fantasy/behavior questionnaire used.
First, the study was underpowered. Although the overall sample was relatively large, the
sizes of individual cells (conditions) were considerably smaller, which may have made detection
of experimental effects more difficult, particularly if the hypothesized mood effect on sexual
self-disclosure was relatively weak.
Second, although the mood induction was effective in shifting moods in the expected
directions, the magnitude of these shifts may have been too small/weak. Two other studies that
examined the influence of mood on self-disclosure, and both of which found that positive mood
increased the breadth and/or depth of verbal personal disclosure, typically noted larger shifts in
mood than was found in the current study. In the current study, the difference in happiness
between the positive and negative mood conditions was approximately 1.5 points (on a 10-point
scale), while Cunningham (1988) and Forgas (2011) both reported the equivalent of roughly a 2
and 4-point difference, respectively. This does not appear to be the result of the type of the mood
induction procedure selected (i.e., an autobiographic memory recall task) because Forgas used an
autobiographical memory recall task; however, it may be that the online modality in which it was
presented may have undermined its efficacy. Inspection of individual participant responses on
the mood induction task suggested that participants generally did not provide as much detailed
information about an emotionally valenced memory, nor attend to the emotional content of this
memory, as instructed, thereby possibly diluting the strength of the mood manipulation. In
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addition, the transient effect of the mood induction may have also diluted its effect, particularly
given the length of the sexual fantasy and behavior questionnaire (252 items). The effect of the
mood induction would have been temporary and likely not have endured throughout the entirety
of the survey; therefore, mood, if it had an effect, likely would have only influenced disclosure
for the initial part of the survey, making detection of an experimental effect difficult.
Also, Forgas (2002 as cited in Forgas, 2011) suggested that having participants rate their
mood immediately after a mood induction procedure may actually depress the effect of the mood
induction; which was the method selected for the current study. However, this was an intentional
part of the study design because having participants wait until the end of the current study to rate
their mood, particularly given the length of the survey and the transient effects of mood
inductions, may have made the detection of mood effects, if present, difficult, if not impossible.
Third, another possible limitation is the strength of the cost perception manipulation. In
the current study, participants in the high cost perception condition were instructed that there was
a random chance they may be selected for an in-person follow-up interview after completing the
survey, which we believed would increase the perceived "cost" involved in disclosing deviant
sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and behaviors. This appeared to be supported by our
results, given that participants in the low cost perception condition reported a greater number and
frequency of deviant sexual fantasies and masturbatory fantasies than those in the high cost
condition. However, participants were not asked what they perceived the probability of this
interview occurring may have been (e.g., 10%? 25%?); therefore, it remains unclear to what
degree individual variation in this subjective estimate may have impacted the strength of this
manipulation. In other words, if the probability had been fixed and provided to participants, it
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may have strengthened or diminished the strength of the manipulation, and consequently
influenced sexual self-disclosure accordingly.
Fourth, the specific domain of deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory fantasies, and
behaviors may be an atypically threatening area of personal disclosure, such that potential effects
of mood and cost perception on disclosure of these may be depressed compared to disclosure in
less threatening domains (e.g., drug use, political leanings/opinions). It is conceivable that this
may have introduced a floor-type effect. From a statistical standpoint, this would restrict the true
range of the outcome variables, particularly at the higher end of the range, which could lead to
greater difficulty in detecting an experimental effect. In other words, this could mean that
participants were more likely to fail to report/underreport deviant sexual fantasies, masturbatory
fantasies, and behaviors. In addition, this effect may become stronger as the social prohibitions
against these increase; for example, reporting a deviant sexual fantasy (e.g., coercive sex) is
likely less threatening than reporting engaging in the corresponding behaviour.
Fifth, the nature of the sexual fantasy and behavior questionnaire used in the current
study could be criticized for being gender-biased. Previous researchers have noted that most
sexual fantasy/behavior inventories ask about action-oriented sexual fantasies/behaviors (i.e.,
overt and explicit acts), which males are more likely to report a greater number and frequency of
compared to females. Research suggests that females are more likely to endorse a greater
frequency of relationship-oriented or romantic fantasies than males (Dindia & Allen, 1998;
Leitenberg & Henning, 1995), a class of fantasies/behaviors that is admittedly lacking in the
questionnaire used in the present study. Therefore, we may have employed a survey that
underrepresented the sexual fantasy life, deviant or otherwise, of females, thereby possibly
depressing the overall reported incidence and frequency of deviant sexual fantasies and
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behaviors in this subsample, and consequently, the entire sample. However, this does not appear
to be the case in our study. Our results showed that approximately equivalent percentages of
males and females endorsed deviant sexual fantasies and behaviour, although of different types.
For example, over 80% of men and women reported exhibitionistic fantasy and masochistic
fantasy, respectively. Similarly, over 65% of men and women reported sadistic sexual behavior
and masochistic sexual behavior, respectively. Therefore, the sexual fantasy/behavior
questionnaire in the current study did not appear to evidence gender bias, at least in terms of
underdetecting deviant sexual fantasy and behavior in women.
Future Research
Future research could examine a variety of promising avenues that could expand on the
statistically significant results, and explore and clarify non-significant ones. To build on the
significant results, one area would be to examine the effects of mood and cost perception on
disclosure of domains other than deviant sexual fantasies and behavior, and that vary in the
degree of which they considered are socially taboo (e.g., drug use, political opinions, etc.). To
build on and clarify the non-significant results, a variety of mood induction techniques, or
variation in the presentation of the mood induction modality (e.g., in-person rather than online),
could potentially strengthen the mood manipulation and clarify whether mood, and the
interactive effect of mood and cost perception, influence sexual self-disclosure.
Other interesting avenues of future research could address some of the limitations of the
current study and offer interesting insights of their own. For example, given the time-limited
duration of mood inductions, creating and integrating an emotional conditioning paradigm into
the survey itself could theoretically increase the duration of mood induction and make detection

54
of mood effects, if present, easier. An initial emotional conditioning exercise could be used to
associate features of the survey itself to a specific mood. For example, under the guise of a word
recognition task, certain pages could present mood specific words (e.g., happy, content, elated)
and be paired with non-relevant features (e.g., a page border), while other pages present nonmood specific words with no additional features. This sequence could be repeated several times
to increase the likelihood that the non-relevant feature would be associated with a specific mood,
and this non-relevant feature could be interspersed in the actual outcome survey of interest, and
in theory, extend the effect of the mood induction.
In conclusion, cost perception (i.e., anonymity/confidentiality) was found to have a
significant but limitated effect on sexual self-disclosure, but mood, regardless of its valence, did
not. However, the lack of a mood effect may be due to methodological limitations of the current
study, which could be addressed by future research.
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Table 1
Sample Characteristics
_____________________________________________
Characteristic

Sample (N = 331)
% (n)
____________________________________________
Self-Identified Gender
Female
58.6 (194)
Male
40.5 (134)
Transgender Female
0.3 (1)
Ethnicity (n = 330)
White
42.4 (140)
Black
24.8 (82)
Latino
14.5 (48)
Asian/Pacific Islander
10.9 (36)
“Other”
7.3 (24)
Sexual Orientation
Completely Heterosexual
72.8 (241)
Mostly Heterosexual
14.2 (47)
Bisexual
6.3 (21)
Mostly Homosexual
1.5 (5)
Completely Homosexual
4.2 (13)
Unsure
0.9 (3)
Marital Status
Single
53.8 (169)
Steady boyfriend/girlfriend
20.1 (63)
Married
11.8 (37)
Cohabiting
8.6 (27)
Divorced
3.2 (10)
Separated
1.6 (5)
_____________________________________________
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix for Continuous Covariates and Outcome Variables

M-C

M-C

SOS

OHI

T-DEP

NumDSF

FrDSF

NumDSM

FrDSM

NumDSB

FrDSB

--

.09

.35**

-.35**

-.30**

-.28**

-.27**

-.23**

-.23**

-.20**

-.10

-.02

-.52**

-.51**

-.50**

-.50**

-.46**

-.45**

-.80**

-10

-.13

-.07

-.09

-.04

-.05

--

.15*

.16**

.15*

.17**

.15*

.14*

--

.95**

.89**

.83**

.63**

.56**

--

.88**

.90**

.61**

.59**

--

.95**

.63**

.55**

--

.60**

.57**

--

.94**

SOS
OHI
T-DEP
NumDSF
FrDSF
NumDSM
FrDSM
NumDSB
FrDSB

--

--

--

*p<.05, **p<.01
Note. M-C = Marlowe-CrownE, SOS = Sexual Opinion Survey, OHI = Oxford Happiness Inventory, T-DEP = Trait depression,
NumDSF = Number of deviant sexual fantasies, FrDSF = Total frequency score of deviant sexual fantasies, NumDSM = Number of
deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies, FrDSM = Total frequency score of deviant sexual masturbatory fantasies, NumDSB = Number
of deviant sexual behaviors, FrDSB = Total frequency score of deviant sexual behaviors.

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for Number of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood and Cost Perception
Cost Perception
Low Cost
High Cost
Mood
M
Adj. M
SD
n
M
Adj. M
SD
n
Positive
11.71
11.43
7.82
34
9.45
9.10
7.48
33
Neutral
12.14
12.76
9.38
36
8.37
8.53
7.93
38
Negative
10.98
10.72
7.54
41
10.13
10.23
7.86
31
Note. Adjusted mean based upon: Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey
total score = 57.94, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.34.

Table 3.2
ANCOVA Summary for Number of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood, Cost Perception, Social
Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression
Source
Mood (M)
Cost Perception (C)
M-C
SOS
TDep
MxC

SS
5.08
291.32
475.51
2673.99
96.84
124.13

Note. R2 = .31, adj. R2 = .28.
*p < .05, **p < .01

df
2
1
1
1
1
2

MS
2.54
291.32
475.51
2673.99
96.84
62.07

F
.05
6.26*
10.21**
57.41**
2.08
.27
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for Number of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood and Cost
Perception
Cost Perception
Low Cost
High Cost
Mood
M
Adj. M
SD
n
M
Adj. M
SD
n
Positive
8.85
8.59
7.56
34
6.57
5.96
5.82
30
Neutral
10.03
10.65
8.81
35
7.02
7.24
7.34
38
Negative
9.20
9.10
6.69
41
7.80
7.91
6.07
29
Note. Adjusted mean based upon: Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey
total score = 57.82, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.35.

Table 4.2
ANCOVA Summary for Number of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood, Cost
Perception, Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression
Source
Mood (M)
Cost Perception (C)
M-C
SOS
TDep
MxC

SS
96.78
291.81
406.75
2042.67
30.30
124.13

Note. R2 = .31, adj. R2 = .28.
**p < .01

df
2
1
1
1
1
2

MS
48.39
291.81
406.75
2042.67
30.30
62.07

F
1.30
7.82**
10.90**
54.76**
.369
.27
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Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics for Number of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood and Cost Perception
Cost Perception
Low Cost
High Cost
Mood
M
Adj. M
SD
n
M
Adj. M
SD
n
Positive
5.59
5.43
4.55
34
5.86
5.67
4.36
28
Neutral
7.08
7.49
5.95
36
6.03
6.12
5.41
38
Negative
5.38
5.21
4.46
40
5.83
5.81
4.24
30
Note. Adjusted mean based upon: Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.95, Sexual Opinion Survey
total score = 57.65, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.19.

Table 5.2
ANCOVA Summary for Number of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood, Cost Perception, Social
Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression
Source
Mood (M)
Cost Perception (C)
M-C
SOS
TDep
MxC

SS
75.44
1.57
52.90
821.17
37.76
38.05

Note. R2 = .23, adj. R2 = .19.
**p < .01

df
2
1
1
1
1
2

MS
37.72
1.57
52.90
821.17
37.76
19.03

F
1.97
.08
2.76
42.83**
1.97
.99
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Table 6.1
Descriptive Statistics for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood and Cost Perception
Cost Perception
Low Cost
High Cost
Mood
M
Adj. M
SD
n
M
Adj. M
SD
n
Positive
19.79
19.27
15.42
34
15.42
14.87
13.19
33
Neutral
22.81
24.10
18.79
36
14.32
19.78
15.46
38
Negative
19.32
18.71
13.88
41
18.23
18.43
15.11
31
Note. Adjusted mean based upon: Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey
total score = 57.94, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.34.

Table 6.2
ANCOVA Summary for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood, Cost Perception,
Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression
Source
Mood (M)
Cost Perception (C)
M-C
SOS
TDep
MxC

SS
176.86
1178.45
1391.25
10431.38
566.16
760.33

Note. R2 = .32, adj. R2 = .29.
**p < .01

df
2
1
1
1
1
2

MS
88.43
1178.45
1391.25
10431.38
566.16
380.17

F
.52
6.94**
8.20**
61.45**
3.34
2.24
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Table 7.1
Descriptive Statistics of Frequency of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood and Cost
Perception
Cost Perception
Low Cost
High Cost
Mood
M
Adj. M
SD
n
M
Adj. M
SD
n
Positive
14.24
13.73
12.24
34
11.83
10.99
11.50
30
Neutral
19.46
20.76
18.16
35
12.11
12.39
14.68
38
Negative
16.22
15.72
12.61
41
14.21
14.44
11.44
29
Note. Adjusted mean based upon: Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.97, Sexual Opinion Survey
total score = 57.94, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.34.

Table 7.2
ANCOVA Summary for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood, Cost
Perception, Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression
Source
Mood (M)
Cost Perception (C)
M-C
SOS
TDep
MxC

SS
597.54
865.36
781.17
8394.43
357.62
484.69

Note. R2 = .32, adj. R2 = .29.
*p < .05, **p < .01

df
2
1
1
1
1
2

MS
298.77
865.36
781.17
8394.43
357.62
242.35

F
2.19
6.35*
5.73*
61.57**
2.62
1.78
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Table 8.1
Descriptive Statistics of Frequency of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood and Cost Perception
Cost Perception
Low Cost
High Cost
Mood
M
Adj. M
SD
n
M
Adj. M
SD
n
Positive
8.71
8.38
7.86
34
9.07
8.82
7.16
28
Neutral
10.75
11.48
9.97
36
9.16
9.32
9.20
38
Negative
8.50
8.19
7.71
40
9.17
9.10
7.61
30
Note. Adjusted mean based upon: Marlowe-Crowne total score = 5.95, Sexual Opinion Survey
total score = 57.65, and Trait Depression subscale score = 20.19.

Table 8.2
ANCOVA Summary for Frequency of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood, Cost Perception,
Social Desirability, Erotophilia, and Trait Depression
Source
Mood (M)
Cost Perception (C)
M-C
SOS
TDep
MxC

SS
146.07
3.67
76.88
2591.50
107.34
95.00

Note. R2 = .22, adj. R2 = .19.
**p < .05

df
2
1
1
1
1
2

MS
73.04
3.67
76.88
2591.50
107.34
47.50

F
1.31
.07
1.38
46.49**
1.93
.85
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Participant Endorsement (%)

18
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10

Fant

8

Mast

6

Beh

4
2
0
LowPos

HighPos

LowNeut

HighNeut

LowNeg

HighNeg

Cell Condition

Note. Fant = Fantasy, Mast = Masturbatory fantasy, Beh = Behavior
Figure 1. Percentage of Participants Endorsing Deviant Sexual Fantasies, Masturbatory Fantasies, and
Behaviors by Cell Condition
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Figure 2. Mean Number of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood and Cost Perception Conditions
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Figure 3. Mean Number of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood and Cost
Perception Conditions
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Figure 4. Mean Number of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood and Cost Perception Conditions

67

Total Frequency Score of DSF
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Figure 5. Total Frequency Scores of Deviant Sexual Fantasies by Mood and Cost Perception
Conditions
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Mean Total Frequency of DSM
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Figure 6. Total Frequency Scores of Deviant Sexual Masturbatory Fantasies by Mood and Cost
Perception Conditions
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Mean Total Frequency of DSM
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Figure 7. Total Frequency Scores of Deviant Sexual Behaviors by Mood and Cost Perception
Conditions

70

APPENDIX A
Informed Consent Form (Low Cost)
You are invited to participate in this study. This study is part of a program of research that is
looking at the sexual fantasies and behaviors of a community and undergraduate population. If
you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete questionnaires relating to
basic demographic information, illegal activities, psychiatric history, sexual fantasies and
behavior, and your general attitudes toward sexual topics.
The questionnaires will take approximately 60-75 minutes to complete. Although there are no
major risks associated with participating in this study, some of the questions are of a personal
and explicit nature that may cause people to feel nervous, sad, angry, or aroused while filling out
the questionnaires. Although most people can stand these feelings, some cannot. If you think
that you cannot stand to experience these feelings then you should not participate in this study.
We, the researchers, do not expect that you will directly benefit by participating in this study.
However, if you complete the study, you will receive $12.50. In order to receive payment, you
will need a credit/debit card and you will have to sign up with PayPal (an independent site that is
unaffiliated with the study). We chose to pay participants through PayPal because it is an
independent and reputable secure online payment service, unaffiliated with our study. In this
way, your payment information is completely separate from your questionnaire responses,
thereby maintaining your privacy and confidentiality.
Finally, the benefit to be gained from participating in this study and filling out the questionnaires
is that this study might help us understand more about sexual fantasies and behavior that people
from the general population experience and engage in.
Participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to participate in this study, but then decide
you do not want to participate, you may stop filling out the questionnaires at any time, for any
reason. You may also refuse to answer any question without penalty. In addition, we have
included a “Prefer to not respond” option to all questions. It is important that you realize that if
you decide not to participate or choose to discontinue participating after the study has begun, you
will not be penalized; it will not, in any way, affect your relationship with John Jay or any of its
faculty. You will still be paid $12.50 for your participation.
If you agree to participate in this research study, all the information gathered in this study will be
identified with a code number ONLY, so your name will not be attached to any of the
information you provide. Your responses are confidential and anonymous. All information will
be kept in a locked office and will only be viewed by members of the research team for purposes
of data scoring and analysis. Data will be analyzed on a group level (i.e., we are not interested in
any one particular participant’s responses). Therefore, your responses cannot be attached to any
personal information that would identify you.
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If, after participating in this study, you have any questions or concerns about the study or about
your participation in the project, you may contact the primary researcher coordinating this study,
Jordan Maile (jmaile@jjay.cuny.edu). If you prefer, you may contact the project supervisor, Dr.
Allwood at mallwood@jjay.cuny.edu at the Department of Psychology, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019. If you have questions about your
rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you would like to discuss
with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research Compliance
Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017

If you would like to participate in this study, check the box indicating you have read and
understand all of the above and have consented to participate in the study.
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Understanding of Consent Form (Low Cost Manipulation Check)

Because this study is being conducted online, we have no way of ensuring that participants
understand conditions of anonymity/confidentiality in this study. In addition, participants do not
have a research team member present to answer their questions. Therefore, we would ask that
you answer the following questions to ensure your understanding of the consent form:

1. My answers are completely confidential and anonymous. None of my answers can be
traced back to me.
True

False

2. My answers will be identified by a participant number only.
True

False

3. Only the research team will have access to my data.
True

False
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APPENDIX B
Informed Consent Form (High Cost)
You are invited to participate in this study. This study is part of a program of research that is
looking at the sexual fantasies and behaviors of a community and undergraduate population. If
you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete questionnaires relating to
basic demographic information, illegal activities, psychiatric history, sexual fantasies and
behavior, and your general attitudes toward sexual topics.
The questionnaires will take approximately 60-75 minutes to complete. Although there are no
major risks associated with participating in this study, some of the questions are of a personal
and explicit nature that may cause people to feel nervous, sad, angry, or aroused while filling out
the questionnaires. Although most people can stand these feelings, some cannot. If you think
that you cannot stand to experience these feelings then you should not participate in this study.
We, the researchers, do not expect that you will directly benefit by participating in this study.
However, if you complete the study, you will receive $12.50. In order to receive payment, you
will need a credit/debit card and you will have to sign up with PayPal (an independent site that is
unaffiliated with the study). We chose to pay participants through PayPal because it is an
independent and reputable secure online payment service, unaffiliated with our study. In this
way, your payment information is completely separate from your questionnaire responses,
thereby maintaining your privacy and confidentiality.
Finally, the benefit to be gained from participating in this study and filling out the questionnaires
is that this study might help us understand more about sexual fantasies and behavior that people
from the general population experience and engage in.
Participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to participate in this study, but then decide
you do not want to participate, you may stop filling out the questionnaires at any time, for any
reason. You may also refuse to answer any question without penalty. In addition, we have
included a “Prefer to not respond” option to all questions. It is important that you realize that if
you decide not to participate or choose to discontinue participating after the study has begun, you
will not be penalized; it will not, in any way, your relationship with John Jay or any of its
faculty. You will still be paid $12.50 for your participation.
If you agree to participate in this research study, all the information gathered in this study will be
identified with a code number, so your name will not be attached to any of the information you
provide. All information will be kept in a locked office and will only be viewed by members of
the research team for purposes of data scoring and analysis. Data will be analyzed on a group
level (i.e., we are not interested in any one particular participant’s responses). However, as part
of the study, you may be randomly selected for a follow-up interview with a member of our
research team. If this is the case, you will be asked to come, in-person, to discuss your
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responses on the questionnaire with the interviewer (you will be paid for the interview as
well). Please note that we will be randomly selecting participants for follow-up according to
a lottery system of participant ID numbers, so your answers have nothing to do with the
selection process. If you have been randomly selected for a follow-up interview, you will be
asked to provide an email address at the end of the survey. If you are not asked to provide
your email address at the end of the survey, than you were not one of the participants
randomly selected for follow-up.
If, after participating in this study, you have any questions or concerns about the study or about
your participation in the project, you may contact the primary researcher coordinating this study,
Jordan Maile (jmaile@jjay.cuny.edu). If you prefer, you may contact the project supervisor, Dr.
Allwood at mallwood@jjay.cuny.edu at the Department of Psychology, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY 10019. If you have questions about your
rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you would like to discuss
with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research Compliance
Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017

If you would like to participate in this study, check the box indicating you have read and
understand all of the above and have consented to participate in the study.
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Understanding of Consent Form (High Cost Manipulation Check)

Because this study is being conducted online, we have no way of ensuring that participants
understand conditions of anonymity/confidentiality in this study. In addition, participants do not
have a researcher present to answer their questions. Therefore, we ask that you answer the
following questions to ensure your understanding of the consent form:
1. Although my answers are completely private, there is a random chance I may be selected
for an in-person interview with a research team member.
True

False

2. A lottery system of participant ID numbers is used to select participants for follow-up.
True

False

3. I will be asked to provide an email address at the end of the survey if I am randomly
selected for a follow-up interview.
True

False
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APPENDIX C
Daily Record (Neutral Mood Induction Stimulus)
You have just completed a demographic questionnaire, but in order to get a better sense of you as
a person, we want to know what you do on a typical weekday. In the space below, please list in
as much detail as possible what you do on a typical weekday. For example, what time do you
usually get up? What do you usually have for breakfast? What are your routine activities (do you
go to school, work, etc.)? What errands, if any, do you typically run? Do you usually meet or
socialize with anyone? What do you do typically do at home at the end of the day (e.g., watch
t.v., etc.)? What time do you usually go to bed?

1. How SAD do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all sad)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
sad)

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
happy)

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
relaxed)

2. How HAPPY do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all
happy)

2

3

4

5

3. How RELAXED do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all
relaxed)

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX D
Autobiographical Memory (Positive/Happy Mood Induction Stimulus)
You have just completed a demographic questionnaire, but in order to get a better sense of you
as a person, we want to know what makes you happy. On this page, please describe your
happiest memory (either from childhood or more recently). Type in your answers in the fields
provided.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Write a paragraph about your happiest memory (it can be from childhood, adolescence,
etc., or a recent memory).

2. When did this occur?
3. Were any other people there? If so, who?
4. What about this memory makes it your happiest one?

5. Describe how you were feeling.

6. How HAPPY were you at the time of this memory?
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
happy)

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
happy)

1(Not at
all
happy)
7. How HAPPY do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at

2

3

4

5
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all
happy)
8. How SAD do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all sad)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
sad)

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
relaxed)

9. How RELAXED do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all
relaxed)

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX E
Autobiographical Memory (Sad Mood Induction Stimulus)
You have just completed a demographic questionnaire, but in order to get a better sense of you
as a person, we want to know what makes you sad. On this page, please describe your saddest
memory (either from childhood or more recently). Type in your answers in the fields provided.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Write a paragraph about your saddest memory (it can be from childhood, adolescence,
etc., or a recent memory).

2. When did this occur?
3. Were any other people there? If so, who?
4. What about this memory makes it your saddest one?

5. Describe how you were feeling.

6. How SAD were you at the time of this memory?
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
sad)

5

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
sad)

1(Not at
all sad)
7. How SAD do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all sad)

2

3

4
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8. How HAPPY do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all
happy)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
happy)

6

7

8

9

10
(Extremely
relaxed)

9. How RELAXED do you feel RIGHT NOW?
1
(Not at
all
relaxed)

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX F
Sexual Fantasy Questionnaire
This questionnaire asks you about your sexual interests in detail. You will be asked to answer
some sensitive questions about your sexual interests. It is very important that you answer truthfully
and if you feel uncomfortable in answering any/all of these questions then you should leave them
blank rather than provide inaccurate information. All information that you provide on this
questionnaire will be completely anonymous and cannot be traced to you individually. The
questionnaire should take approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. We thank you for your time
and honesty in completing this questionnaire.
Report your level of sexual interest in relation to the following themes or situations:
Levels of sexual interest
0 = Have never fantasized about
1 = Have fantasized about once or twice
2 = Have fantasized about several times
3 = Have fantasized about frequently
4 = Have fantasized about very frequently
Sexual interest in general:
1) Men
2) Women
3) Young boys (age 10 and under)
4) Teenage boys (age 11-14)
5) Young girls (age 10 and under)
6) Teenage girls (age 11-14)
Sexual interest in detail:
7) Sex in beautiful settings
8) Sex in public places
9) Sex on silk or satin sheets
10) Sex on rubber or plastic sheets
11) Masturbating in front of a sexual partner
12) Masturbating in front of a stranger
13) Being masturbated by another person
14) Cuddling
15) Performing oral sex (e.g., giving a blow job,
going down on someone)
16) Receiving oral sex (e.g., giving a blow job,
having someone going down on you)
17) Passionate kissing
18) Touching intimate places

Level of interest
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0

1

2

3

4

0
0
0

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4
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Level of sexual interest
0 = Have never fantasized about
1 = Have fantasized about once or twice
2 = Have fantasized about several times
3 = Have fantasized about frequently
4 = Have fantasized about very frequently
19) Touching non-intimate places
20) Wearing uniforms, masks, etc.
21) Sex with an animal
22) Sex with inanimate (non-living) objects
23) Causing mild pain to a sexual partner
24) Causing severe pain to a sexual partner
25) Being caused mild pain by a sexual partner
26) Being caused severe pain by a sexual partner
27) Being strangled or asphyxiated by a sexual partner (without dying)
28) Strangling or asphyxiating a sexual partner (without killing him/her)
29) Sex with a dead person
30) Being spanked
31) Spanking others
32) Torturing others
33) Being tortured
34) Being whipped on sexual parts of body (e.g., breasts, genitals)
35) Being whipped on non-sexual parts of the body (e.g., legs, back)
36) Whipping somebody else on sexual parts of the body
(e.g., breasts, genitals)
37) Whipping somebody else on non-sexual parts of the body
(e.g., legs, back)
38) Defecating (shitting) on a sexual partner
39) Violently raping somebody
40) Being violently raped
41) Humiliating somebody
42) Being humiliated
43) Being bound or tied up
44) Tying up somebody
45) Drugging or sedating another person for sexual reasons
46) Sex while drunk
47) Sex with a drunk person
48) Anal intercourse
49) Sex in a bathroom
50) Physically attacking someone
51) Being physically attacked
52) Dominating/controlling a sexual partner
53) Being dominated/controlled by a sexual partner
54) Being forced to have sex against your will

Level of interest
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0

1

2

3

4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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Level of sexual interest
0 = Have never fantasized about
1 = Have fantasized about once or twice
2 = Have fantasized about several times
3 = Have fantasized about frequently
4 = Have fantasized about very frequently
55) Forcing somebody to have sex against his/her will
56) Sex while being threatened with a weapon
57) Sex while threatening someone with a weapon
58) Stalking or secretly following somebody
59) Being stalked or secretly followed by somebody
60) Secretly observing or peeping at a stranger
61) Being secretly observed by a stranger
62) Watching strangers have sex (while they’re not aware of it)
63) Sex while watching soft pornography
64) Sex while watching hard pornography
65) Being watched while having sex
66) Frottage (rubbing your genitals against a stranger without
permission)
67) Making obscene sexual phone calls to a sexual partner
68) Making obscene sexual phone calls to a stranger
69) Receiving obscene sexual phone calls from a sexual partner
70) Making threatening phone calls
71) Receiving threatening phone calls
72) Exposing your genitals to a stranger (without the stranger’s
permission)
73) Using sex toys (e.g., dildos, inflatable dolls)
74) Wearing kinky clothes (e.g., leather or rubber)
75) Wearing sexy underwear
76) Having a sexual partner give you a lap dance
77) Having sex on the beach
78) Having a sexual partner give you a playful striptease
79) Kissing the neck of a sexual partner
80) Gently biting a sexual partner
81) Nibbling the ear of a sexual partner
82) Being gently bitten by a sexual partner
83) Receiving a massage
84) Giving a massage

Level of interest
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

*Note: This questionnaire was a version used in a previous study, and for the proposed
dissertation project, it was adapted as an online version. The online version is the same, except
all items in this questionnaire were resorted in blocks of 4 according to perceived deviance (as
per results of a previous study conducted by the PI). In other words, each block of 4 questions
consists of a non deviant, mildly deviant, moderately deviant, and very deviant item in a
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randomized order. Also, in the online format, each fantasy item is directly followed by a
question asking about the frequency with which the participant masturbated to the fantasy, and
has engaged in the corresponding behavior, using the same 5-point numerically anchored scale.
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APPENDIX G
Sexual Opinion Survey
Please respond to each item as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and
your answers will be completely confidential.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. I think it would be very entertaining to look at hard-core pornography
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

2. Pornography is obviously filthy and people should not try to describe it as anything
else.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

3. Swimming in the nude with a member of the opposite sex would be an exciting
experience.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

4. Masturbation can be an exciting experience.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5. If I found out that a close friend of mine was a homosexual, it would annoy me.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree
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6. If people thought that I was interested in oral sex, I would be embarrassed.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

7. Engaging in group sex is an entertaining idea.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

7
I strongly
disagree

8. I personally find that thinking about engaging in sexual intercourse is arousing.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

6

7
I strongly
disagree

9. Seeing a pornographic movie would be sexually arousing to me.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

10. Thoughts that I may have homosexual tendencies would not worry me at all.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

11. The idea of being physically attracted to members of the same sex is not depressing.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree
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12. Almost all pornographic material is nauseating.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

13. It would be emotionally upsetting to me to see someone exposing themselves
publicly.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

14. Watching a gogo dancer of the opposite sex would not be very exciting.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

15. I would not enjoy seeing a pornographic movie.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

16. When I think about seeing pictures showing someone of the same sex as myself
masturbating it nauseates me.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

17. The thought of engaging in unusual sexual practices is highly arousing.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree
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18. Manipulating my genitals would probably be an arousing experience.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree

19. I do not enjoy daydreaming about sexual matters.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

20. I am not curious about explicit pornography.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

21. The thought of having long-term sexual relations with more than one sex partner is
not disgusting to me.
1
I strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

6

7
I strongly
disagree
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APPENDIX H
Oxford Happiness Inventory
1. I don’t feel particularly pleased with the way I am
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

2. I am intensely interested in other people.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

3. I feel that life is very rewarding.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

I have very warm feelings towards almost everyone.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

4
Slightly
Agree

4.

5.

I rarely wake up feeling rested.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

I'm not particularly optimistic about the future.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

6.

I find most things amusing.
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1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

I am always committed and involved.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

10. I don't think that the world is a good place.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

11. I laugh a lot.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
Disagree Disagree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

8.

9.

Life is good.
1
2
Strongly Moderately
Disagree Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

12. I am well satisfied with everything in my life.
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1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

13. I don't think I look attractive.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

14. There's a gap between what I would like to do and what I have done.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
Agree

I am very happy.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

16. I find beauty in some things.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

17. I always have a cheerful effect on others.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

18. I can find time for everything I want to do.
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1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

19. I feel that I'm not especially in control of my life.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

20. I feel able to take anything on.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

21. I feel fully mentally alert.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

22. I often experience joy and elation.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

23. I don't find it easy to make decisions.
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1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

24. I don't have a particular sense of meaning and purpose in my life.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
Agree

25. I feel I have a great deal of energy.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

26. I usually have a positive influence on events.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

27. I don't have fun with other people.
1
2
3
4
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

28. I don't feel particularly healthy.
1
2
3
Strongly Moderately
Slightly
Disagree Disagree
Disagree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

4
Slightly
Agree

29. I don't have particularly happy memories of the past.
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1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Moderately
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly
Agree

5
Moderately
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree
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APPENDIX I
State-Trait Depression Scales, Trait Subscale
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read
each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate
how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on
any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.
1. I feel gloomy.
1
2
Almost
Sometimes
Never

3
Often

4
Almost
Always

2. I feel happy.
1
2
Almost
Sometimes
Never

3
Often

4
Almost
Always

3. I feel depressed.
1
2
Almost
Sometimes
Never

3
Often

4
Almost
Always

4. I feel sad.
1
2
Almost
Sometimes
Never

3
Often

4
Almost
Always

5. I feel hopeless.
1
2
Almost
Sometimes
Never

3
Often

4
Almost
Always

*This questionnaire is not allowed to be reproduced in its entirety (10-items) due to a copyright
agreement I made with the licensing company (Mindgarden.com), but I am permitted to
reproduce 5 items as a sample.

96

APPENDIX J
Marlowe-Crown Short Form version C (M-C Form C)
Instructions: Please answer the following questions by circling the best answer.
(1) It is sometimes hard for me to go on
with my work if I am not encouraged.

True

False

(2) I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get
my way.

True

False

(3) On a few occasions, I have given up doing
something because I thought too little of my
ability.

True

False

(4) There have been times when I felt like
rebelling against people in authority even
though I knew they were right.

True

False

(5) No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always
a good listener.

True

False

(6) There have been occasions when I took
advantage of someone.

True

False

(7) I’m always willing to admit it when I make
a mistake.

True

False

(8) I sometimes try to get even rather than
forgive or forget.

True

False

(9) I am always courteous, even to people who
are disagreeable.

True

False

(10) I have never been irked when people
expressed ideas very different from my own.

True

False

(11) There have been times when I was quite
jealous of the good fortune of others.

True

False

(12) I am sometimes irritated by people who
ask favors of me.

True

False

(13) I have never deliberately said something
to hurt someone’s feelings.

True

False
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